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This study examines the role that Indians played in King Philip's War. 
It argues that Indians and Indian fighting tactics saved the colonies from 
destruction. This contention relies heavily on the assertion that February 
1676 was the turning point in the war. Chapter I reexamines the role that 
Indian spies and informants played in King Philip's War, and argues that 
they saved the colonies from surprise attacks on major settlements. 
Chapter II argues that "friendly" Indians played a significant role as 
counterinsurgents against a common enemy. Additionally, they provided 
extra numbers at a time when the colonial militias suffered from 
impressment derelictions. Finally, Chapter III shows that only after the 
colonial militia adopted Indian skulking tactics did they successfully repel 
Philip's forces. In summation, this thesis argues that colonial authorities 
organized English-Indian companies after a complete economic collapse 
in February 1675/6. It was this Indian alliance that led them to victory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 1675/6, a wounded Captain Benjamin Church arrived in 
Plymouth to discuss the United Colonies' course of action. King Philip's war 
had been raging through the New England colonies for nine months and 
left in its wake unprecedented devastation. The combined forces of the 
Wampanoags, Nipmucks and Narragansetts pressed closer to Boston and 
Plymouth. The colonies feared that the Narragansetts would soon take 
Rehoboth - a settlement thirty miles west of Plymouth proper. If they did, 
authorities realized that their enemy would soon take Plymouth. 
Captain Church addressed the council with great determination. 
He boldly asserted that, given a company of 300 men comprised of one-
third Indians, he would "lye in the Woods as the Enemy d id" and repel the 
Narragansett threat at Rehoboth.1 This request probably floored the 
Council who had recently offered Church 60 or 70 soldiers for a campaign 
to Rehoboth. The idea that Plymouth colonial militia would adopt Indians 
as soldiers was no doubt scoffed at by some of the members. After a brief 
consideration, the Council of War replied "That they were already in debt, 
and so big an Army would bring such charge upon them...And as for 
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sending out Indians, they thought it no waves advisable."2 Captain 
Church was then dismissed. 
One week later, Plymouth colony sent Captain Michael Peirse and 
Lieutenant Samuel Fuller to Seekonk - several miles west of Rehoboth -
with "20 or 30 of the southern Indians."3 The Council of War believed that 
a campaign in the west would prevent the Narragansetts pushing forward 
to take Rehoboth. With Peirse and Fuller was a Wampanoag Indian 
named Captain Amos who took command of a small portion of Peirse 
and Fuller's company. In total the Peirse, Fuller and Amos' group consisted 
of more than one hundred Indian and English soldiers.4 
On 25 March 1676, Peirse's mixed English and Indian company 
arrived at Seekonk. After a quick strike they wounded their enemy. 
Confident that their mission was successful they rested a night. The next 
day, Peirse marched west from Seekonk to finish the job. One of the 
Captain's guides spotted a few enemies in the distance and Peirse 
ordered the entire company to pursue them. Unaware that the 
Narragansetts had set a trap, his company found itself in the center of an 
ambush, outnumbered by hundreds. According to George Bodge, the 
colonists lost fifty-two English and eleven Indians that day.5 Peirse and 
Fuller were among those killed. 
The campaign to save Rehoboth was as effective as hitting a 
hornet-nest with a stick. The Narragansetts replied to Peirse's attack by 
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taking Rehoboth on 28 March and burning nearly eighty houses and 
barns.6 A day later. Providence suffered an attack that left it immobilized 
for the duration of the war. Enemy forces pushed closer to Plymouth. 
There was a change in attitude among colonial authorities in Boston 
and Plymouth. Days after the report came in that Peirse's company was 
ambushed, Plymouth ordered "the number of three hundred Indians, well 
fitted to go forth, and be ready for a march by the eleventh of April 
next."7 Boston and Plymouth were now willing to use Indians in the militia. 
What happened in February 1675/6? Why did the Council of War 
refuse Church his Indians on 20 February and only a week later order 
Captain Peirse to march with a company of almost thirty Indians? 
This thesis attempts to answer that question. Captain Church 
requested Indians at a time when the colonies still believed that they 
could win a war without Indian support. Until 21 February 1675/6, 
Massachusetts, Plymouth, and Rhode Island authorities did not authorize 
the use of Indians in the war. Colonial authorities believed that all Indians 
shared a common racial identity and would help Philip's war-effort from 
within. Thus, for the first eight months, the colonists spent their resources 
keeping Indians out of the war as allied combatants. Additionally, only 
Connecticut authorized the use of Indians as combatants, spies, and 
informants during the early months of the war. 
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This thesis divides King Philip's War into two halves: the first stage 
occurs between June 1675 and February 1675/6, and the remaining 
second stage that takes place between March 1675/6 and August 1676. 
During the first half of the war, the colonists held on to their Old 
World phalanx-style methods. They believed that part of their identity as 
Englishmen came from their military structure. To adopt the Indian method 
of skulking meant that the wilderness had consumed them. It also meant 
that they were admitting that Old World combat was not effective 
against enemy combatants. Thus, for the first eight months of the war the 
colonists kept Indians out of the war and held onto their military identity. 
By February, Philip's forces had accumulated important alliances. 
Most notably, the Narragansetts, Agawams, and Nipmucks joined in the 
campaign against the colonies. These groups won battles at strategic 
locations causing the colonies to suffer heavy damages to their 
infrastructure. The Indian confederacy under Philip swelled in population 
and during many battles dwarfed colonial militia companies. 
On 21 February 1675/6, the colonies announced that they were so 
far in debt that they could not continue the war.8 In Chapter 2, I call this 
announcement the "February Declaration." At the time the Declaration 
was made, the colonial authorities were forced to reevaluate their military 
strategy. On the one hand, the colonies could keep their Old World and 
racially divided style of warfare and lose the war; or they could use 
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Indians and skulking, and lose their military identity. Peirse's campaign at 
Seekonk was the first major change toward a racially inclusive militia. It 
was also at this moment that the colonists decided that they valued their 
lives over their old identity. 
This thesis shifts the turning point of the war from April 1676 to 
February 1675/6. Douglas E. Leach argues that the tide turned when the 
colonists shifted from a defensive to offensive war in the early months of 
spring. The argument in this thesis, however, contends that the shift was 
not a physical victory but rather a psychological change to warfare 
techniques. The colonists were placed in a struggle for survival and were 
losing. In February, that struggle came to a peak. Captain Peirse's 
expedition was symbolic of the colonies' realization that the Old World 
methods were no longer effective in the New World. 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter, Spies and 
Informants, discusses Indians as information gatherers for the colonies. 
During the war, colonial officers found that Indians could be used to 
gather information regarding the enemy forces' location, size, and 
expected attacks. By April 1676, colonial leaders had gathered such 
precise information that they prevented major damage to the western 
settlements. 
The second chapter deals primarily with friendly Indians in the 
colonial militia. This study defines friendly Indians as any Indian who 
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viewed himself as an individual in the same struggle for survival as the 
colonists. Often, but not all the time, these were Christian Indians who had 
been born in settlement towns and were raised by the English. It outlines 
the importance of friendly Indians at a time when the colonies were 
nearly out of money, provisions, and soldiers. Friendly Indians, who had 
remained loyal to the colonies, provided the militia with hundreds of men 
willing to fight. 
Finally, the third chapter illustrates the importance of Indian skulking 
tactics. It shows that toward the beginning of the war, colonial forces 
were ill prepared for combat in America. They often marched loudly 
through the woods, waited for their enemy in open fields, and carried 
heavy armor that slowed them down. As a result, these fighters were easy 
targets for a quick, silent, and invisible enemy. When the colonial 
authorities adopted friendly Indians into the colonial militia, the former 
taught the English proper skulking techniques that saved hundreds of lives. 
This thesis will argue that when the colonies used Indians in King 
Philip's War, the Indians significantly contributed to the colonial victory. By 
arguing that February 1675/6 was the major turning point in the war, this 
thesis identifies the definitive moment when colonial tactics, ideology, 
and identity changed. Chapter two and three compare the pre-February 
war with the post-February war. This comparative method allows the thesis 
6 
to illustrate how successful the colonists were after they adopted Indians 
and Indian tactics into the colonial militia. 
NOTES 
1 Thomas Church, Entertaining Passages Relating to Philip's War which Began in the 
Month of June 1675 (Boston, 1716), 19. 
2 Church, Enterta/'n/ng Passages, 19. 
3 George Madison Bodge, Soldiers in King Philip's War being A Critical Account of That 
War with A Concise History of the Indian Wars of New England from 1620-1677 (Baltimore, 
MD: Clearfiled Company, Inc. 2002), 331. 
4 Ibid, 347-9. 
s Ibid. 
6 Ibid, 331. 
7PCR, V: 192-3. 
s RGCMB V: 70. 
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CHAPTER I 
SPIES AND INFORMANTS 
Accomplished spies leave few traces. Informants hope that their 
activities will remain covert. For those keeping their true natures in the 
shadows, even as they become cultural and political border crossers, 
continued safety requires secrecy before, during, and after a mission. It 
was no different in the seventeenth century. Though the English 
depended on Indian informants and spies throughout King Philip's War, 
the written record of their activities is thin. This vacuum can be explained 
by the need to protect indigenous espionage figures even after the war's 
end. Despite their absence from many records, Indian informants and 
spies were vital allies in the war against Philip. 
If Jill Lepore is correct, that King Philip's War was also a battle of 
words, and that in its aftermath the colonists disassociated themselves 
from Indians by writing histories, the accounts of Indians as key figures in 
the English victory will necessarily be few and far between.1 This is a 
second factor complicating the historian's attempt to understand the role 
of Indian spies and informants in the 1670s. 
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For the purpose of this chapter, informants are individuals that 
supplied the English with information on the enemy's position, strength, 
and population without concealing their identity. These Indians ranged 
from captives, friendly Indians, formerly hostile Indians, and runaways. In 
some cases, informants tortured the enemy for information and relayed 
the intelligence to colonists. Other times, they knew where the enemy's 
position was because they had either been with or seen the enemy at 
one time. 
Historians who have written about King Philip's War have shown that 
colonists used spies. Yet they skim over or ignore the spies' contribution to 
the English victory in 1676. In Douglas E. Leach's Flintlock & Tomahawk, 
Leach briefly mentions the role of Indian spies. He argues that the colonists 
were more prepared for a Nipmuck attack in February 1675/6 when they 
were presented with information gathered and presented to them by the 
Indians.2 Unfortunately, his argument that the war was "a struggle for 
survival between two mutually antagonistic civilizations, and only a total 
victory of one side or the other would be likely to settle the matter" insists 
that the war was bifurcated - or separated by two different identities.3 
Thus, instead of recognizing spies and informants for their contributions, he 
believes that had "Gookin acted with less speed and determination" after 
a spy told him of the Nipmuck raid, "the ensuing event might have had a 
far different ending."4 Leach believes that it was Gookin's response, not 
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the Indian's intelligence that changed the course of events. Additionally, 
Leach writes, it was not the spy's information that saved the western 
settlements from destruction, but rather the arrival of Captain Samuel 
Wadsworth's company that "helped turn the tide."5 According to Leach, 
Indian informants played a peripheral role in the outcome of King Philip's 
War. 
Historians now accept that the war was not as racially divided as 
Leach believed. Richard R. Johnson maintains that the "enduring 
characterization that pits white man against Indian has a satisfying 
simplicity that has too often obscured a more complex reality."6 More 
recent historians argue that while the war, in the words of James Drake, 
"certainly had an ethnic dimension," allegiances "did not derive solely 
from ethnicity."7 In King Philip's War some Indians were fighting the same 
struggle for survival as the English colonists. 
In their analysis of that struggle historians have missed the 
significance of Indian spies and informants. Daniel Mandell argues that in 
February 1675/6 spies "saw several things that would augur the course of 
the war over the next few months."8 Mandell does not consider the 
significance of spies in the war. Rather, he argues that their information 
was true and provided the English with valuable insight. Rather than 
acknowledge his activities as an informant for the English, Jill Lepore 
contends that John Sassamon was killed because of his "ability to act as a 
11 
mediator" and that it was "bilingualism and his literacy" that led to his 
murder.9 Philip Ranlet argues that Sassamon represents multiple identities 
as both Indian and English and historians can use Sassamon's identities to 
understand New England legal practices.10 James Drake, claims that 
Sassamon was the epitome of a failed strategy of Indian integration into 
European culture. Sassamon, for Drake, was a diplomat who offered Philip 
protection under the colonial government and, as a result, died.11 None 
of these authories see Sassamon as an informant who provided 
intelligence of Philip's planned attack. Thus, these authors miss the 
significance of Indians as spies and informants by only focusing on the role 
they played as mediators between two cultures rather than on their 
intelligence during times of conflict and crisis. 
Rather than focus on the border-crossing abilities and information 
gathering of Indian spies and informants, this chapter will examine the 
information those spies gathered and its effects. Furthermore, this chapter 
will suggest that Sassamon and other Indians provided the colonists with 
information on impending attacks. This chapter asks how beneficial the 
information gathered by Indians was to the colonists. In some instance, it 
was unquestionably beneficial, as when colonial authorities heeded 
warnings that saved western settlements from destruction. From the 
Mohegans and Pequots that tortured their captives, to those that 
deserted Philip's forces with key intelligence on his strategies, location. 
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and strength, this chapter will offer a new perspective on the use of Indian 
informants and spies during King Philip's War. 
JOHN SASSAMON 
The first time John Sassamon shows up in the records is as an 
interpreter for Increase Mather and John Eliot in the 1640s.12 After his 
conversion to Christianity, Sassamon worked with Eliot to translate the Bible 
into Algonquian. His achievements earned him a reputation as "a man of 
eminent parts & wit."13 He then spent his time in Natick, Massachusetts 
proselytizing to other Indians while teaching them reading and writing.14 
Eventually, in 1653, he attended Harvard University along with four other 
prominent Indian men.15 
Nine years later Sassamon left the English to live with Alexander, the 
Wampanoag sachem who took power in 1660 after his father, Massasoit, 
died. When Alexander died in 1662 his brother, Philip, ascended into the 
position of sachem.16 Sassamon became Philip's assistant, and Philip 
seemed to trust Sassamon to translate any contracts made between the 
Wampanoags and the English.17 As Lepore argues, "the same skills that 
made Sassamon valuable to Eliot now made him almost indispensable to 
Philip."18 The sachem could not speak or read English, and, thus, 
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Sassamon's mark appears on many of Philip's contracts made between 
1663 and 1670, proving that he was a valued assistant. 
The records are not clear about Sassamon after 1672. One source 
states that he "was sent to preach to the Namaskets, and other Indians of 
Middleborough."19 Another reports that he was with Philip until the winter 
of 1675.20 Others maintain that he was still under the protection of the 
colonies and was used as a mediator between various Indian groups and 
colonial authorities.2' Wherever Sassamon was in 1674, he was at least 
close enough to Philip to gather information regarding the mounting 
conflict; he was, also, close enough to Philip for the sachem to know that 
Sassamon was aware of his plans.22 
In January 1675 John Sassamon travelled to Plymouth Colony with 
information that Philip, sachem of the Wampanoags and Pokanokets, was 
preparing for war against them.23 Sassamon had spent the past ten years 
as one of Philip's counselors, and he knew that Philip would kill him if the 
colonies learned of his plan to attack them. It was with a great personal 
risk that Sassamon told Governor Josiah Winslow the colonies, colonists, 
and both of their lives were in danger.24 
Winslow had heard reports such as these many times before from 
other Indians. Sometime in early 1671, an unnamed Indian reported that 
Philip was preparing for war against Plymouth.25 The sachem was called to 
Taunton, Massachusetts to answer for these claims. In a treaty on 10 April 
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1671 (Treaty of Taunton), Philip admitted that he had "broken this my 
Covenant with my Friends, by taking up Arms, with evil intent against 
them."26 To rectify the situation, Philip agreed to give Plymouth ail of his 
firearms and weapons "for their security so long as they shall see 
reason."27 Plymouth believed that they had averted war through this 
agreement. 
According to George Bodge, in April 1675 a Christian Indian named 
Waban "came to Gen. Gookin and warned him of Philip's intention shortly 
to attack the English."28 He continued, "the Wampanoags intended 
Mischief and were only waiting for the Trees to leave out, that they might 
the easier conceal themselves after they had begun."29 Waban probably 
felt comfortable telling this to Gookin since the latter was the 
superintendent of Indian affairs in Massachusetts Bay Colony. There is no 
account of General Gookin's reaction to this information. Additionally, 
there is no record of whether Waban knew Sassamon or how he came 
across this information. Waban went to Gookin again in May "and urged 
the same and said that...the Indians would fall upon the towns."30 
By 1675, Winslow seems to have expected these rumors. Since 1660, 
colonial authorities nearly always called Indians sachems to answer for 
rumors that they were conspiring against the colonies. These meetings 
had become a regular occurrence in New England. Sassamon and 
Waban were no different than those that came before them. The 
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information just as plausible, and both had respectable reputations in 
New England. But this time Winslow dismissed the informants and ignored 
the warnings.31 One month after Sassamon left Plymouth, he was found 
dead in Assawompset Pond.32 Five months later, in June 1675, Plymouth 
executed Sassamon's suspected murderers (three Wampanoag Indians); 
two days later Philip held a war dance in preparation for war.33 
Sassamon carried information that might have changed the 
outcome of King Philip's War - or prevented the war altogether. The 
colonies were not prepared, militarily or strategically, for war when 
hostilities broke out in June 1675. The Massachusetts General Court did not 
met until 9 July 1675 - several weeks after Philip first attacked Swansea.34 
Kyle Zelner says that the "court began to prepare for conflict" only after 
they met in July, and voted "for several war taxes...to amass supplies for 
an army."35 Plymouth responded a week earlier but took several weeks to 
send troops on an expedition against Philip's forces.36 By the time 
Massachusetts and Plymouth companies arrived, Swansea and 
surrounding towns lay in ruins. Philip's forces had killed ten English colonists 
in two towns before the Plymouth Colony acknowledged that the war 
had begun.37 
Sasssamon and Waban were informants who provided the English 
with credible information that would have, perhaps, saved many lives in 
1675 and 1676. Yet, the colonists during the early summer of 1675 were not 
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yet prepared to rely on Indian informants. Nevertheless, the information 
Sassamon carried might have cost Philip the war. In the words of 
Nathaniel Saltonstall, "King Philip suspecting he either would divulge or 
had already made known this Secret to the English, took Councel to kill 
this Sosoman."38 Sassamon's role as an informant caused his death. 
THE MOHEGANS AND PEQUOTS AS INFORMANTS 
In August 1675, John Pynchon, found of Springfield, sent a letter to 
Governor John Winthrop Jr. of Connecticut. He explained the usefulness 
of Indians as informants in the war against Philip. Pynchon explained that 
"Philip with forty of his men is now at a place called Ashquoach a little on 
this side of Quabog."39 He continued, "our Indians judge that either Philip 
will go to them at Memenimissee, or that they will come to Philip at 
Ashquoash, which the Indians think is rather the more convenient place 
and so they make 250 soldiers."40 The intelligence that Pynchon relayed to 
Winthrop specified that "Philip have but 30 guns, and the other 10 bows 
and arrows."41 
According to the Indian informants, Philip's forces "are now weak 
and weary and may be easily dealt with, whereas if we let them 
alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by stealth."42 Winthrop then 
sent out a force of 250 soldiers, which resulted in the capture of one of 
17 
Philip's most valuable leaders. Hartford, in awe that the Connecticut 
Indians recovered such precise information wrote to Pynchon and asked 
for any intelligence "and earnestly desire as any comes to your hand it 
may be posted away to us."43 
To show their support for the United Colonies, Mohegan Indians, with 
their sachem Uncas, marched into Boston and reported that the 
Narragansetts were hiding Wampanoag men and women.44 The 
Narragansetts posed the greatest threat to the United Colonies, and 
Massachusetts and Plymouth spent much of their efforts attempting to 
keep these Indians out of the war. This information led Massachusetts 
authorities to judge a preemptive strike against the Rhode Island Indians 
as necessary. In July 1675, Plymouth and Massachusetts ordered the 
Narragansetts to sign a loyalty compact ensuring that if Philip's subjects 
entered into their territory, they would turn them over to the English as 
prisoners.45 The Narragansetts signed and the colonists believe that this 
agreement would keep them from fighting in the war. 
THE GREAT SWAMP FIGHT OF DECEMBER 1675 
Both Plymouth and Massachusetts were reluctant, at first, to listen to 
Indian informants. While some ranking officers valued any intelligence that 
could help in the campaign against Philip, the colonial authorities rarely 
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authorized it. Captain Benjamin Church consistently trusted any Indian 
who fought alongside his company. Early in the war, Church encountered 
John Alderman, an Indian who had left Mount Hope in search of English 
protection. According to Church, Alderman "gave him an account of the 
State of the Indians, and where each of the Sagamores head quarters 
were."46 Alderman even offered to escort Church to Philip's sister-in-law 
Weetamo's territory. After serious deliberations, the Massachusetts 
authorities sent Captain Baxter, Captain Hunter, and Captain Church to 
find Weetamo's camp. After a quarter-mile, the three companies found 
three of the sachem's warriors and killed one of them. As they travelled 
farther, they came to their location and open fired. After some time, the 
English forced the entire village to retreat into the swamps and the fort 
was taken.47 
Colonial mistrust came as a result of a general racial prejudice 
against all Indians. This mistrust cost the colonies a great deal. Not only 
were some soldiers not willing to listen to Indian informants, but also they 
wanted all Indians dead. Captain Samuel Moseley was particularly fond 
of the latter option, and on occasion was disciplined by his own superiors 
for cruel treatment of friendly Indians.48 As Douglas E. Leach writes "Many 
of the troops had nothing but contempt and hatred for all Indians."49 
In October, English authorities received information from a 
Wampanoag informant that Canonchet, the Narragansett sachem, was 
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planning an attack.50 This came as something of a surprise since the 
English had signed an alliance treaty with the sachem at the outbreak of 
the war. The July Treaty specified that the Narragansetts would remain 
loyal to the colonists, refrain from entering the war, and "use all Acts of 
Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entring his Lands or any other 
Lands of the English."51 Though the colonists were doubtful that the 
Narragansetts would stay out completely, they hoped that the treaty 
would pacify the Narragansetts for a short while. 
Several times between July and October, Indians reported to 
English that Wampanoag canoes travelled to and from Narragansett 
territory.52 In his contemporary history of the war, William Hubbard, 
emphasized that the Narragansetts resented the contract with the English 
from the beginning and actively welcomed Philip's men, women, and 
children onto their land as refuges.53 Others knew that the Narragansetts 
accepted Wampanoag messengers.54 
The report in October, however, was different. This time it was an 
Indian who was with Canonchet when he made the plans.55 This Indian 
had been with the Narragansett sachem for several weeks and 
Canonchet. The informant knew firsthand that the Narragansetts had 
breached the contract. The General Court of Massachusetts announced 
that the Narragansetts "but jugle with us" and scheduled a preemptive 
strike.56 
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The colonies attacked in December 1675. Despite large numbers of 
Narragansett warriors, the battle was relatively successful for the colonists. 
This was due, in part, to the informants. Connecticut and Massachusetts 
forces surprised the Narragansett warriors with a concerted attack. 
Unaware that the English knew of their plans, the Indians did not prepare 
a counterattack, and fought a somewhat disoriented fight.57 After hours 
of battle, the English drove the Narragansetts from the fort into the 
swamps in retreat. A wounded Captain Benjamin Church arrived on the 
scene as the Indians retreated. He announced, "Some of the Enemy that 
were then in the Fort have since inform'd us, that near a third of the 
Indians belonging to all that Narroganset Country were killed by the 
English, and by the Cold that Night, that they fled out of their Fort so hastily 
that they carried nothing with them."58 Based on this information. Church 
recommended that the English take the fort for shelter and starve out the 
Narragansett forces. 
General Winslow agreed to Church's proposal. Winslow rode his 
horse toward the fort with the order to preserve it. Another Captain, who 
opposed Church's advise, to take shelter in the Narragansett forts, told 
Winslow "That if he mov'd another step towards the Fort he would shoot 
his Horse under him."59 This stopped Winslow. The Captain then called for 
the company doctor - who was working on Church's bullet wound - and 
explained the situation. The doctor returned to Church and said "if he 
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gave such advice as that was, he should bleed to Death like a Dog 
before they would endeavour to stench his blood."60 Church, now in fear 
for his life, withdrew his recommendation. The company then burned the 
fort to the ground. 
If the Indians supplied Church with the correct information than the 
soldiers could have camped in the fort and pursued the enemy after 
being fully rested. The Narragansetts grew more bellicose after what was 
known as the Great Swamp Fight in December 1675. The Rhode Island 
tribe soon threw their lot in with Philip and decimated several frontier 
towns in Massachusetts and burned Providence.61 In some cases, the 
United Colonies listened to their informants and it led them to victory; 
other times the information was dismissed and the English forces lost 
opportunities to remove serious threats. 
The Great Swamp Fight of 1675 with the Narragansetts might have 
turned out differently if an Indian informant had not told Plymouth Colony 
that Canonchet was planning an attack against the English. The 
Narragansetts, wielded incredible strength in the region, and the United 
Colonies feared them more than any other group. William Hubbard wrote 
that if the Narragansetts sided with Philip "it would have been very 
difficult, if possible for the English to have saved any of their inland 
plantation from being utterly destroyed."62 According to Sherborne Cook, 
the Narragansett warrior population was roughly 1,000, with a reserve 
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population of almost 4,00c.63 The preemptive strike at the Narragansetts' 
fort in December 1675 eliminated one-third of the Indians in all of 
Narragansett territory (if we can take Church's informant at his word).64 If 
all of these figures are accurate, or off by only a little, the preemptive 
attack on Narragansett lands diminished their population to just over 
2,600. This was a tremendous victory for the English - one that would never 
have happened without the Indian informant. 
UNRECOGNIZED SPIES 
In his narrative "An Historical Account of the Doings and Sufferings 
of the Christian Indians in New England," Daniel Gookin wrote the sole 
surviving firsthand account of Indian spies.65 Completed in 1677, Gookin's 
account was not published until 1836.66 The original manuscript is believed 
lost. Many of Gookin's other works were destroyed in a fire during the early 
eighteenth century.67 
As the Superintendent of Indian affairs in the Massachusetts Bay 
colony, Gookin was afforded certain knowledge and control unavailable 
to others.68 The colonial authorities trusted him with the responsibility of 
looking after the Indians in Massachusetts. During the war Gookin used his 
position to take measured risks with his Indian allies. He rarely told others of 
his Indian spies, and since none of his contemporaries mentioned Indian 
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spies in their writing, one might deduce that they were unaware of Indian 
spying.69 
High-ranking officers did not know about Gookin's spies, and in one 
instance the Superintendent's secrecy almost proved fatal. By 26 October 
1675, colonists feared a general uprising by all Indians in southern New 
England. Colonists claimed that allegiances were ethnic, and that all 
Indians would ally with Philip.70 Fear escalated when colonists heard that 
the Nipmucks joined Philip's forces.71 Coupled with the belief that the 
colonists could not tell the difference between a friendly Indian and an 
enemy Indian, colonial authorities interned all Indians onto Deer Island in 
October 1675. Other laws prevented Indians from travelling more than 
one mile from their homes unless accompanied by an Englishman.72 When 
a corporation in London sent money, supplies, and letters for better 
treatment of the Indians on Deer Island, Massachusetts authorities assured 
it that "these Christian Indians [were] allies and friends of the English" and 
that for their security this internment policy was necessary.73 
Job Kattenanit, one of Gookin's spies, was granted permission to 
travel into Nipmuck country to find his family (whom he had left to serve 
the English). Captain Mosely "became infuriated, and created a most 
unpleasant scene in the presence of the assembled troops."74 Mosley 
represented the view that Indians were not trustworthy. Other disagreed 
with Mosely and his supporters. During the war, colonists, soldiers, and 
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authorities often divided over whether the English could trust Indians 
during the war. Attacks by Indians on major settlements in the west 
increased the division between the two sides. Despite fierce controversy 
the colonists realized that their survival necessitated the ability to listen to, 
learn from, and use Indians. 
To protect the Indians, Gookin only told a few people of the spying 
expeditions. In November 1675, Captain Henchman's forces, near 
Hassanamesit caught Job Kattenanit on a mission. At first there was a 
heated debate over whether Henchman's company should kill the Indian 
for travelling without an English chaperone and, they assumed, conspiring 
against the English. Fortunately, one company officer offered Kattenanit 
an opportunity to explain his situation to Captain Henchman. When the 
spy showed Henchman his mission note, signed by Gookin, the Captain 
admitted that he was unaware of any spy practices organized by the 
colonial authorities.75 Henchman sent Kattenanit to Boston for further 
examination, and the spy was eventually cleared. 
GOOKIN'S TWO SPIES 
Job Kattenanit and Daniel Gookin's other spy, James Quannapohit, 
gathered, perhaps, the best intelligence of the war. In December 1675, 
the Narragansetts fought against the colonists in The Great Swamp Fight -
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one of the most important battles of the war. The battle made it clear the 
colonies needed more information regarding the whereabouts, strength, 
and intention of other Indian tribes who had the potential to cause severe 
damage to English settlements.76 In January 1675/6, the colonial Council 
of Massachusetts asked Major Daniel Gookin to take several Christian 
Indians and employ them as spies for the English.77 Gookin, who had spent 
months trying to prove that Christian Indians could be of great use to the 
colonies, accepted the order and took both James Quannapohit and 
Job Kattenanit from Deer Island to his house in Cambridge. Gookin 
offered them five pounds and instructions before they left the city on 30 
December.78 
The pair told the Nipmucks they were escaped captives from 
Hassanamesit and that they were inquiring about the current situation of 
the rebel forces. They said there were more Indians on Deer Island who 
were awaiting this information so that they could help in the rebellion. 
Confident that these two spies were interested in supporting the 
rebellion, the Nipmucks told Kattenanit and Quannapohit that Philip was 
near Fort Albany seeking an alliance with the Mohawks.79 Next they told 
them that they had planned a rendezvous point for themselves, the 
Narragansetts, and the Wampanoags in early spring. After coming 
together, the three tribes planned a full-scale united attack against the 
English in which they planned to destroy several major towns.80 
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Furthermore, in regards to their strength, the Nipmucks explained that they 
"gloried much in their number and strength, and that [in] all this war their 
loss of men was inconsiderable."81 Even more shocking was that they 
"boasted of their expectation to be supplied with arms and ammunition 
and men from the French, by the hunting Indians."82 According to this 
report, not only were enemy forces still strong, united, and well preserved, 
they expected the French to supply them with weapons. 
Finally, the Nipmuck sachem, Mautampe, told the two spies that 
the first full-scale attack by all three bands would be against Lancaster. 
The plan was well designed. First, Nipmuck and Narragansett forces would 
burn the only bridge into Lancaster preventing any English forces from 
rescuing the town. Then they would destroy Lancaster and all the 
surrounding areas before the English found their way into the area.83 
Kattenanit risked his life to retrieve information for the colonies. He 
decided to stay behind in Nipmuck territory for several days after his 
partner James Quannapohit and he had gathered information about the 
impending attack on Lancaster, Quannapohit p leaded with Kattenanit to 
come to Boston. According to Gookin, the conversation began when 
Kattenanit announced, "I am willing to venture a little longer, and go 
down with the Indians that are to meet with the Narragansetts; and, if I 
live, I may get more intelligence. And,' said he, 'if God spare my life, I 
intend to come away about three weeks hence."84 His partner responded 
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by pleading "after I am gone, I fear the enemy will suspect us to be spies, 
and then kill you."85 These two Indians knew that they risked everything to 
support the English. 
In early January, Quinnapohit left the Nipmucks for Cambridge. 
Kattenanit stayed with the enemy for several days longer hoping that he 
could gather more intelligence. On 24 January, Quinnapohit found 
Gookin and warned him of the attack on Lancaster. Gookin then relayed 
this information to the Council of War and pleaded that they send troops 
to protect the surrounding towns. Not believing the severity of the threat, 
Massachusetts hesitated in making a decision and delayed the 
reinforcements. Days later, reports arrived that a small settlement near 
Sudbury was burned to the ground and the Nipmucks had killed or taken 
captive the inhabitants.86 Massachusetts authorities, still cautious about 
trusting Quinnapohit, sent "two mounted patrols to cover the frontier line 
from Groton down to Medfield."87 
Two weeks later, Gookin awoke to Job Kattenanit pounding at his 
door.88 It was ten o'clock at night, and Kattenanit, out of breadth, came 
bearing very important information.89 Kattenanit told Gookin that "Before 
he came from the enemy at Menemesse, a party of the Indians about 
four hundred, were marched forth to attack and burn Lancaster; and, on 
the morrow...they would attempt it."90 Furthermore, the spy reported that 
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he had stayed with the Nipmucks long enough to observe an alliance 
with his hosts and the Narragansetts.91 
Gookin leapt out of his bed and ran down the street to consult 
Thomas Danforth - a member of the Council of War. The two of them 
spent several hours writing to local militia groups to reinforce Lancaster by 
morning. Letters were sent to Marlborough, Concord, and Lancaster that 
recommended all the townspeople to abandon their locations and seek 
shelter in the surrounding towns. The letters warned that this attack would 
consist of four hundred Narragansett and Nipmuck warriors, and that the 
attack was scheduled for the next morning.92 Gookin and Danforth had 
done all they could do to protect the western settlements; now they 
played the waiting game. 
By daybreak, Captain Samuel Wadsworth, of Milton, received the 
letter and gathered forty of his men for a march to Lancaster. When 
Wadsworth's company arrived, the bridge was already burned and 
Nipmuck and Narragansett forces had begun their descent onto the 
town. The sight was gruesome to colonial forces. Mary Rowlandson, who 
was captured by Nipmuck warriors during this attack, wrote the following 
in her narrative: 
The first coming was about Sun-rising; hearing the 
noise of some Guns, we looked out; several 
Houses were burning, and the Smoke ascending 
to Heaven. There were five persons taken in one 
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house, the Father, and the Mother and a sucking 
Child, they knockt on the head; the other two 
they took and carried away alive. There were 
two others, who being out of their Garison upon 
some occasion were set upon; one was knockt 
on the head, the other escapted: Another their 
was who running along was shot and wounded, 
and fell down; he begged of them his life, 
promising them Money...but they would not 
hearken to him but knockt him in head, and stript 
him naked, and split open his Bowels.93 
For several hours, the Nipmuck and Narragansett forces burned houses, 
killed and dismembered civilians, and destroyed crops. The Nipmucks, 
especially, had no sympathy for these inhabitants. In one instance, the 
Indians scalped a man, stripped him naked, and watched as he crawled 
away in agony.94 
Wadsworth discovered another bridge into the area that the 
enemy had partly destroyed by pulling off the planks; he used it to 
engage the Indian forces.95 His company immediately fortified a garrison 
house owned by a local inhabitant Cyprian Stevens.96 The militia 
company split: one half stayed at the garrison and continued the pitched 
battle, while the other tried to retrieve another garrison-house within the 
town. This latter building protected another bridge that if it were fortified 
would allow allied forces the opportunity to sandwich the Indians in a two-
pronged battle. The Indians, who realized this, raced Wadsworth's forces 
to the garrison and burned it before it was fortified.97 Wadsworth, and the 
rest of his men, retreated, and Lancaster was destroyed. 
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Boston authorities brought Kattenanit in for information. With 
Lancaster now demolished, Boston authorities wondered where the 
Nipmuck and Narragansett forces would strike next. Kattenanit informed 
them that the plan was to attack Medfield, Groton, and Marlborough with 
forces from the Lancaster raid.98 Massachusetts' authorities sent out Major 
Thomas Savage and Captain Mosely to Medfield with between five 
hundred and six hundred m e n . " On 21 February, colonial forces found 
fifty houses burned to the ground and many dead residents.100 The Indians 
had not finished with the town when Major Savage's company arrived. 
With nearly double the amount of soldiers, colonial forces drove the 
Indians back into the swamps and saved Medfield from total 
destruction.101 
Based on the information provided to the authorities by Kattenanit, 
Boston reinforced both Groton and Marlborough two days after the 
Medfield fight. While they managed to stave off some attacks, the Indians 
seemed to be everywhere. After the Medfield fight Mary Sheppard, whom 
the Nipmucks had captured on 12 February, was released. When the 
English came upon her, she informed them that the Indians "were in three 
Towns beyond Quobaog.102 Major Savage and Captain Mosely split their 
forces to cover more ground. Somewhere near Quoboag, Mosely met 
with Major Treat's Connecticut forces and drove the Indians back into the 
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swamps.103 Mosely was injured in the battle and both officers deemed it 
unwise to chase the enemy into the woods. 
Information soon came that the Indians had already planned an 
attack near Northampton, Massachusetts. According to Nathaniel 
Saltonstall in 1676, enemy forces were not aware that the English had 
recovered information on the attack and "found such warm 
Entertainment [and] had kindled their Fire."104 When Major Savage arrived 
with a company of roughly five hundred soldiers the Nipmuck and 
Narragansett warriors "were forced to fly with great Confusion."'05 An 
informant told Savage that the Indians still had a larger contingency 
force, and the informant believed that if Savage stayed at his location the 
English could drive the Indians into an ambush at Deerfield.106 Nipmuck 
forces returned with one thousand warriors to find two English companies 
prepared for battle. Major Savage's groups "pursued them to their usual 
Place of Rendezvous near Deerfield" and forced the Indians into 
retreat.107 
February 1675/6 was a particularly difficult month for English forces. 
The Indians attacked fifty-two towns, pillaged twenty-five, and destroyed 
seventeen.108 Indians also destroyed towns that supported troops with 
food, provisions, and rations. Colonial authorities realized that abandoned 
towns put more pressure on soldiers. With minimal resistance remaining in 
the towns, Indian forces marched toward Boston and Plymouth without 
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trouble. To prevent abandonment, the Courts ordered that "it shall not be 
in the liberty of any person what soever who is by law enjoyned to 
trayne...ward or scout to leave the Towne he is an Inhabitant of upon any 
pretence whatsoever...upon the penalty of twenty pounds."109 People in 
the areas south of Boston had begun moving closer to the city for 
protection, and Boston authorities wanted this to stop. Wrentham 
colonists, for example, abandoned their town in the spring 1676 and 
migrated north to Dedham.110 
Colonial forces had survived the first wave of onslaughts. Spies were 
to thank for this. Gookin's two spies, James Quannapohit and Job 
Kattenanit, provided the English with information that proved vital. If 
Kattenanit had not informed Gookin of the impending attack on 
Lancaster, and the several later attacks, the English might have Isot all of 
the major settlements west of Marlborough. 
THE WAR SHIFTS 
As the war shifted toward a colonial offensive in April, more Indians 
surrendered to English authority. Colonial authorities received information 
on where Philip was and where he was attacking next. On 10 April 1676, 
Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote, an informant told one company "that the 
Enemy had a designe, on the next Day, to fall upon the Garrison, and 
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some few Houses that remained at Marlborough, to revenge the Death of 
one of their eminent Men that was slain when they were last there."111 
Quickly, Major General Winslow went with a company of men to meet 
Major Thomas Savage in Boston. They consulted with Captain Mosely and 
planned an expedition for the next day. When the forces arrived in 
Marlborough they did not find the enemy and were called back to 
Boston. The English abandoned Marlborough too soon, however. Days 
later Boston received information that Philip's forces had waited for the 
colonial militia to leave before attacking. Everything in Marlborough, 
except the Garrison, was destroyed.112 The informant gave them the 
correct information, but impatience cost another settlement. 
On 21 April, Gookin received information from one of his Indians 
that Philip's remaining forces numbered at 1,500 and that they had 
burned Sudbury to the ground.113 Almost immediately after hearing this. 
Captain Hugh Mason was sent, with several other forces, to Sudbury. 
Philip, surprised that the English arrived so quickly, retreated into a local 
riverbed. By the time Philip gathered his troops for a counterattack, the 
English had secured the only bridge into the town. Shortly, thereafter, 
three more companies arrived as reinforcements under Captain Prentiss, 
Corporal Phipps, and the Indian company of Captain Hunting.114 The 
three reinforcement forces arrived one day later on 22 April to find that 
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the enemy had already withdrawn during the previous night. The Sudbury 
fight was a victory for the colonists.115 
As the war neared its end, colonial forces enjoyed victory after 
victory over Philip's forces. In his A True Account of the Most Considerable 
Occurrences, Nathaniel Saltonstall wrote that the English should not forget 
the Indian informants, who "have done us considerable Services."116 He 
continued, 
they serve especially for Spies and Scouts to 
[stalk] the skulking Enemy, and drive them out of 
the Swamps and Woods, and then the English 
can the better fight them, and indeed our 
greatest Exercise hath been to find the Enemy 
rather than to Fight them, unless they be very 
much Superior in Numbers. But now the Indians 
dread our Approaches with those Indian 
Vancourriers, and the Lord hath caused much of 
his Terror to fall upon them.117 
CONCLUSION 
When colonial forces acted on the information that spies and 
informants retrieved they saved themselves from disaster. Information on 
Philip's forces afforded the English the opportunity for preemptive attacks 
against the Narragansetts, Nipmucks, and Wampanoags. It also better 
prepared the English. The attack at Lancaster, in February 1675/6, could 
have devastated western Massachusetts and paralyzed colonial 
35 
reinforcements if Kattenanit had not informed the colonies of the 
attack.118 The intelligence that Mohegans and Pequots brought to the 
Connecticut colony early in the war forced the capture of several of 
Philip's most valued leaders. According to George Bodge, Connecticut 
did not suffer the damages of its neighboring colonies because it chose to 
use Indians from the earliest stages of the war.119 Massachusetts and 
Plymouth, however, trusted their spies only after they suffered significantly 
greater losses. During the latter half of the war, spies and informants 
provided Massachusetts and Plymouth with opportune successes. 
The colonies suffered devastating losses when they did not heed 
the information gathered by informants. Governor Josiah Winslow could 
have protected the southern and western settlements with reinforcements 
after Sassamon and Waban informed him of Philip's plans. He also could 
have also prepared the colonies for war with a reformed and improved 
military system. Kyle Zelner illustrates how unprepared New England was 
for this conflict, and why they suffered so many losses during the early 
stages of war.120 
Spies and informants were willing to risk their lives to get correct 
information to their English allies. The information provided by Indians that 
Philip's forces were near New York seeking aid from the Mohawks was 
accurate, and it allowed Plymouth and Massachusetts an opportunity to 
petition to Governor Andros of New York.'21 When Kattenanit and 
36 
Quannapohit told Gookin that the Nipmucks and Narragansetts were 
planning an attack on Lancaster for the morning of 10 February, the 
intelligence was verified. When Indians warned of an attack against 
Marlborough in April 1676, the attack came - though the English had 
disbanded. When Sassasmon and Waban told Governor Winslow that 
Philip was scheduling a war with the colonies, it came. These Indians 
provided colonists with up-to-date, honest, and correct information that, 
when heeded, saved the colonies. 
Friendly Indians in King Philip's War played a crucial role in helping 
the English prevent Philip from achieving victory. Their information 
prevented the Nipmucks from advancing into Boston. The information also 
enabled the colonists to surprise-attack the Narragansetts and minimize 
their fighting forces before the tribe entered the war. Spies and informants 
risked their lives to gather intelligence on Philip's forces' location, size, and 
strength. Without this information, Philip's allies may have inflicted greater 
devastations from which the colonies may not have recovered. 
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CHAPTER II 
'TCANNOTl DO OUR WORK WITHOUT THEM" 
Throughout the seventeenth century, Indian alliances were essential 
to the survival of New England's English settlements. From the earliest 
attempt at establishing permanent footholds, the colonists were aware of 
their vulnerability to attack by European competitors and indigenous 
nations, and formed English-Indian compacts whose military elements 
included wartime mutual aid. The first treaty "to confirme a Peace" 
occurred at Plymouth in March 1620/1. The six part agreement established 
by Governor John Carver, the Wampanoag sachem of the Pokanoket 
Massasoit, and their various councilors, stipulated, "That neither he 
[Massasoit] nor any of his should injure or do hurt to any of our people." It 
also said, "If any did unjustly war against him [Massasoit], we would aid 
him; if any did war against us, he should aid us."1 In 1636, shortly before 
the outbreak of the Pequot War, the Narragansetts entered into a similar 
agreement with the Massachusetts Bay Colony.2 Two years later, after the 
close of the war, the Mohegans signed a similar treaty with both the 
Narragansetts and the English in Connecticut.3 Over the course of 
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decades, these documents influenced trade relations, military actions, 
Christian missions, Indian sovereignty and land transactions.4 
This chapter will look at the use of Indians as combatants during 
King Philip's War. It describes the war in three parts. First, it will discuss the 
early fear among colonists that the Indians were united in conspiracy 
against the colonies. Next, the chapter will address the mid-war period 
when Philip's forces had tremendous success in recruitment and combat. 
Colonists soon realized that keeping friendly Indians out of the war 
brought significant losses. The third section will discuss the vital 
reintroduction of Indians into the militia companies. In summation, this 
chapter argues that without the help of Indian alliances and warriors, New 
England would not have survived the war. 
Furthermore, this chapter will address another aspect of King Philip's 
War alliances. The common assumption among scholarly research is that 
the turning point of the war was April 1676 when Mohawk raids and 
starvation weakened Philip's forces.5 This chapter will argue that the 
turning point in the war came earlier in February 1675/6 when the colonies 
found themselves nearly out of soldiers, economically in debt, and unable 
to supply military companies with firearms or provisions. The decision to 
readmit Indians into the war as allies, at the point the colonists faced 
complete economic and military failure eventually shifted the war from a 
defensive to offensive operation. This chapter believes that the turning 
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point of the war was not a physical victory, as other scholars have argued, 
but rather a strategic shift. Thus, the most important moment in the war 
was what this chapter will call the "February Declaration" when a 
Massachusetts council decided that the colonies could no longer 
continue the war without a change. 
EARLY ALLIANCES 
The first war in New England occurred in 1636 and lasted until 1638. 
The Pequot War, as it is now known, was a struggle between English 
forces, their Indian allies, and the Pequots of southern New England. 
According to sources, the two Indian groups that allied with the English, 
Narragansett and Mohegans, ac ted as interpreters, strategists, diplomats, 
consultants, and informants. In Captain John Underhill's account he 
emphasized his reliance on one Indian warrior. Underhill wrote, "wee had 
an Indian with us that was an interpreter, being in English cloathes, and a 
Gunne in his hand." Taking notice of the Indian, some Pequots asked, 
"what are you an Indian or an English-man" to which the interpreter 
responded, "come hither...and I will tell you." The interpreter then shot 
dead the curious Indians.6 
Indians also served as guides that helped the English navigate 
unfamiliar terrain. John Endecott, in 1636, marched with two Indian guides 
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that led him through the swamps and forests of Connecticut.7 The English 
valued Indians as guides and strategists since they supplied information on 
who the "enemy was, where they were, how to get there, what their 
probably intentions were, and keeping that kind of information up to date 
over time."8 When William Bradford recounted the events of the Pequot 
War years later, he mentioned how useful the Indians were in bringing the 
soldiers to enemy forts.9 
Indian alliances also swelled the numbers of English militias. 
Sherburne Cook estimates that the entire Pequot community numbered 
roughly 3,000 in 1637, with approximately 1,000 warriors.10 At a battle in 
Mystic, Connecticut, the colonial Court sent only fifty English volunteers to 
fight against roughly 400 men, women, and children.11 Expecting to be 
outnumbered, military leaders requested the help of both the 
Narragansetts and Mohegans who each supplied the English with several 
hundred warriors. With their military support the English surrounded and 
burned Pequot villages. 
FEAR OF A GENERAL UPRISING 
At the outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675, many paranoid 
colonists feared that an ethnic and racial identity would promote a 
concerted pan-Indian campaign against the colonies. John Easton wrote 
47 
that the "English were jealous that there was a general plot of all Indians 
against the English."12 William Harris, in Rhode Island, echoed Easton's 
observation.13 William Hubbard argued that when fighting began other 
Indians were eager "or might soon be perswaded to joyn with him in 
acting this bloudy Tragedy."14 A resident of Warwick, Rhode Island, 
insisted, "There is a rumour as though all the Indians were in combination 
and confederacie to exterpate and root out the English, which many 
feare."15 Years later, Captain Benjamin Church recalled that Plymouth 
colonists feared all Indians "had form'd a design of War upon the 
English."16 
These fears were perpetuated by the many reports claiming Philip 
had sent messengers to neighboring sachems in hopes of an alliance.17 
Reports acknowledged that Philip had sent messengers to Awashonks the 
tribal leader of the Sagkonets to ask for her support. Captain Church 
confirmed this report when the sachem told him that six of Philip's men 
had already spent days convincing her to ally with his forces.18 Governor 
Roger Williams of Rhode Island wrote that he had seen canoes traveling 
from Philip's territory of Mount Hope to the Narragansetts.19 William 
Hubbard emphasized that the Narragansetts received several emissaries 
before the war began and agreed to protect Philip's men, women, and 
children during wartime.20 Other colonists heard of Philip dispatching 
messengers to several tribes in the attempt to secure a confederacy.21 
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Alliances between English colonies were quite different than 
alliances between Indians. English alliances were based on a shared 
identity and language.22 When Roger Williams offered Plymouth his 
support in the war, despite political differences, he claimed "all the 
Colonies were Subject to one K[ing] Charles and it was his pleasure and 
our Duty and Engagement for one English man to stand to the Death by 
Each other in all parts of the world."23 John Easton, who was irritated that 
Massachusetts and Connecticut entered Rhode Island and formed a 
compact with the Narragansetts without permission, agreed that 
"when...English blood was spilt" it "engaged all Englishmen, for we were 
to be all under one king."24 
Unlike the English, Indian alliances were fragile. This was because, as 
Jenny Hale Pulsipher writes, Indians needed to emphasize that the 
confederacy was one of "political choice rather than ethnicity."25 Indians 
did not have a transnational identity. Howard Russell maintains, "various 
tribes had from time to time battled or displaced one another even 
though speaking dialects of a common language."26 Thus, when Philip 
sought alliances with other Indian groups he used fear to pressure them to 
join. Philip's six men at Sogkonate told Awashonks that if she refused 
Philip's offer they would "kill the English Cattel, and burn their Houses on 
that side [of] the River, which would provoke the English to fall upon her, 
whom they would without doubt suppose the author of the Mischief."27 His 
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messengers told other sachems, "the English had a Design to cut off all 
the Indians round about them, and that if they did not Joyn together, they 
should lose their Lives and Lands."28 
New England's colonial authorities believed that swift, unilateral 
action could sever alliances among the Indians and shorten the war's 
length. Fearing a pan-Indian alliance against them, they continued this 
practice throughout much of the war. Governor Roger Williams 
emphasized how vitally necessary it was to keep the Mohegans and 
Narragansetts from entering into the war.29 Plymouth sent Captain 
Benjamin Church to meet Awashonks, request her continued loyalty "and 
shelter her self, and People under [their] Protection.30 Instead of asking 
Awashonks to supply the English with fighters, he insisted that she and her 
people remain "within [their] own limits of Sogkonate" and stay out of the 
war.31 
Suspicion of treachery was one of the barriers to English 
acceptance of Native assistance. After meeting with Awashonks, Church 
was sent to the Pocasset tribe with a similar proposal for another sachem, 
Weetamoo.32 Plymouth sent two additional messengers to the Nipmuck 
Indians asking them to reinstate their allegiance to the colony.33 
Massachusetts authorities sent Captain Edward Hutchinson and Captain 
Thomas Wheeler into western Massachusetts to request the allegiance of 
the Quabaug Indians.34 One Springfield resident, John Pynchon, wrote a 
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letter to Governor Winthrop Jr. informing him that the Mohegans and 
Pequots were "our professed friends" and cannot be allowed to join with 
Philip.35 Almost immediately, Winthrop sent messengers to the Connecticut 
Indians asking for their allegiance. 
During the early stages of the war potentially hostile Indians were 
instructed to remain on their lands to prevent any English suspicion. The 
Narragansetts were of particular interest to the United Colonies. Both the 
Connecticut and Massachusetts Bay authorities sent messengers into 
Rhode Island in July 1675 to prevent the Narragansetts from entering the 
war.36 
The agreement instructed the Narragansetts to resolve any hostilities 
between the English and the Indians; reinstate their loyalty to the colonies; 
and "use all Acts of Hostility against the said Philip & his Subjects, entring 
his Lands or any other Lands of the English."37 The Articles, signed by four 
Narragansett leaders, six colonial authorities, and a translator, insisted that 
the Narragansetts only join the war if Philip, or Philip's warriors, appealed 
to the Narragansetts on their land. Though Jenny Hale Pulsipher argues 
that the agreement called for Narragansetts to provide "active assistance 
against Philip's forces," the colony did not stipulate that Indians needed 
to seek and kill Philip.38 Instead, the Article instructed the Narragansetts to 
remain on guard on their own lands.39 
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Colonists in Massachusetts suspected that the Natick Christian 
Indians might join Philip's forces. In October 1675, these Indians were 
removed to Deer Island by order of the Massachusetts Bay authorities for 
"our security."40 The following month, the Massachusetts Court ordered, 
"none of the said Indians...shall presume to go off the said islands upon 
pain of death; and it shall be lawful for the English to destroy those that 
they find straggling off from the said place of their confinement."41 The 
Court also restricted "any person or persons" from taking, stealing, or 
carrying "away either man, woman, or child of the said Indians, off from 
any the said island where they are placed."42 In Mendon, the 
"Hassanemesit Indians [were] ordered to [build] a fort...and to move 
there with their families as soon as their corn crop was harvested."43 Thus, 
even Indians that did not identify with Philip's rebellion were under close 
surveillance. More so, these Christian Indians were instructed to keep out 
of the war. 
CONNECTICUT AND ITS INDIAN ALLIES 
Unlike its neighbor colonies, Connecticut authorities quickly realized 
the usefulness of Indian allies. The colony saw the Mohegans and Pequots 
as "our professed friends."44 Governor John Winthrop Jr. and Springfield 
founder John Pynchon, immediately after the outbreak of King Philip's 
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War, encouraged the use of Indian scouts, fighters, interpreters, and 
guides. Winthrop as early as June 1676, sent Captain Cudworth into battle 
with several friendly Indians.45 One month later, Captain Edward 
Hutchinson rode with three Indian guides and translators to convince the 
Nipmucks to renew their loyalty to the colony.46 Others, like Captain 
Prentice, rallied a few friendly Indians for their companies.47 To show their 
support and appreciation, Mohegan and Pequot Indians brought the 
scalps of their enemy to Connecticut authorities.48 
As a result of this alliance, Connecticut was "saved [from] many 
disasters, and secured many substantial victories."49 By August 1675, John 
Pynchon sent a letter to John Winthrop Jr. informing him that a friendly 
Indian brought intelligence that "Philip with forty of his men [are] now at a 
place called Ashquoach a little on this side of Quabaug."50 He continued, 
"our Indians judge that either Philip will go to them at Memenimissee, or 
that they will come with Philip at Ashquoach, which the Indians think 
rather the more convenient place, and so they make 250 soldiers."51 
Pynchon ended his letter with a brief mention of Philip's strength, 
according to his Indians: "Philip [has] but 30 guns, and the other 10 bows 
and arrows, are now weak and weary and may be easily dealt with, 
whereas if we let him alone...they will burn our houses and kill us all by 
stealth."52 When Winthrop received this letter he sent a company of 
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Mohegans, Pequots and English to raid Philip's location, and these 
companies captured many important enemies.53 
THE ENEMY WITHIN 
At the outset of the war, Massachusetts and Plymouth did not share 
Connecticut's attitude toward Indians as combatants in the colonial 
militias. As the war progressed, and Philip's campaigns saw success in the 
western settlements, the two eastern colonies disapproved of 
Connecticut's strategy. When the Nipmucks, Agawams, and 
Narragansetts joined in Philip's fight, Massachusetts and Plymouth 
colonists increased their distrust of all Indians. 
At the outset of the war the Nipmucks of western Massachusetts 
seemed content to let Philip and the colonies fight it out.54 The English 
relied on this neutrality to search through Nipmuck territories for Philip.55 But 
Wampanoag forces moved quickly through the western parts, and 
paranoid colonists feared that Philip would intimidate the Nipmucks into 
confederacy. Connecticut sent several representatives and ordered that 
they turn in their weapons.56 The Nipmucks hesitated (probably to defend 
themselves in case of a Wampanoag attack) and, instead, offered their 
continued allegiance to the colony. 
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Unsatisfied with the Indians' decision, Massachusetts Bay sent 
Captain Hutchinson and a small militia company into Nipmuck territory to 
demand the weapons. Expecting hostility, the Nipmuck warriors 
ambushed Hutchinson and his company.57 They then attacked the local 
town of Quaboag and laid waste to it.58 According to one source, Philip's 
forces arrived in Quaboag that day and united with the Nipmucks.59 
The second event occurred a month later. Because of Philip's 
success in "recruiting" the Nipmucks and several other Indian bands, 
colonial authorities feared every Indian as potentially dangerous. In early 
September 1675, Massachusetts demanded the Agawams turn in all their 
weapons to the colony. To prevent another Nipmuck-like occurrence, the 
English abducted the tribe's children and sold them into slavery. This act 
of hostility angered the Agawams who, unlike the Nipmucks, had sided 
with the colonists at the outset of the war. As a result, the Agawams joined 
with Philip.60 In September and October, Agawam forces burned three 
hundred homes in Springfield, Massachusetts. They were also responsible 
for the massacre of Captain Thomas Lathrop and his sixty soldiers near 
Deerfield Massachusetts on 18 September 1675.61 The attack sent 
Shockwaves and panic through adjacent regions. 
When the Narragansetts cast their lot with Philip, the colonies feared 
the worst. Keeping these Indians out of the war was crucial. 
Contemporary historian William Hubbard wrote that if the Narragansetts 
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actively engaged in warfare against the English earlier in the war "it would 
have been very difficult, if possible for the English to have saved any of 
their inland plantations from being utterly destroyed."62 Every attempt was 
made to keep them neutral. 
Philip was aware that the Narragansetts would make powerful allies 
and at tempted to entice them into confederacy by sending them the 
heads of English soldiers.63 The English viewed this as a violation of the July 
1675 Treaty and quickly requested an explanation from the Narragansetts. 
They saw this request as a violation of sovereignty. Hostilities rose until 
attacks by Nipmuck and Agawam warriors at Springfield "resulted in the 
United Colonies' invasion of Narragansett territory."64 Canonicus, the 
sachem of the Narragansetts, viewed this as open hostility against his 
people and finally accepted Philip's invitation of confederacy.65 
Attacks by Nipmuck, Agawam, and Narragansett forces on non-
combatants further intensified panic. Between "August 1 and November 
10, 1675, Indians did not leave a single one of Massachusetts' eight towns 
on the Connecticut River unscathed."66 
The general population feared that Philip's success in recruiting 
Indian groups would inevitably lead Christian Indians to cast their lot with 
the sachem. The Nipmucks exemplified this expectation because they 
were once part of John Eliot's proselytizing mission.67 In Massachusetts, 
colonists began persecuting all Indians, whether or not they remained 
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loyal to the colonies. At the helm of this movement was Captain Samuel 
Moseley who "was censured by the government...for arresting without 
warrant a group of praying Indians at Marlborough, whom the 
townspeople had nearly lunched on the spot."68 
Moseley's hatred for all Indians earned him a reputation among 
colonists, and many turned to him when they felt uneasy about strange 
Indians in their towns. On 7 August 1676, while the war was coming to a 
close, four men were incarcerated for the massacre of six Christian Indians 
recently released from Deer Island (three women and three children).69 
Jenny Hale Pulsipher rightly contends that Massachusetts and Plymouth 
had a difficult job keeping the population from murdering any Indians 
residing in the colonies.70 James Drake has emphasized that the colonial 
authorities made the best attempt to "determine an Indians' degree of 
guilt before deciding his fate," but, on the other hand, the general 
population were not so judicious in their decisions.71 
Despite their disapproval of Indian persecutors, Massachusetts and 
Plymouth authorities seem to have had their own suspicions that the war 
was racially motivated. To prevent a united Indian alliance, Plymouth 
banned the sale of weapons to any Indian within the colony. The Court 
ordered, "none shall lend any Gun or Guns to the Indians on pain of 
forfeiting them or the value of them to the colonies use."72 Shortly 
thereafter, a second law prevented the sale of guns to any Indian upon 
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penalty of death.73 Though these laws were aimed at hostile Indians, they 
were not particular to them and left many non-hostile Indians unable to 
defend themselves against persecution.74 
However, an influential minority of individuals in Massachusetts did 
care about the welfare of Indians. Douglas E. Leach, in Flintlock & 
Tomahawk, labels this group "moderates" because they insisted on 
moderate treatment rather than persecution.75 Many of these colonists 
had worked closely with Indians prior to the war's outbreak. They spent 
years forging relationships based on mutual appreciation. 
Daniel Gookin, John Eliot, and Thomas Danforth advocated for fair 
treatment of Indians throughout the war. Because of their missionary work, 
all three maintained close relationships with Indians during the 
seventeenth century and came to respect Indian culture. Eliot came to 
New England in 1631 as a Christian minister. In 1646, he established the first 
Praying Town in Massachusetts where Indians came and learned 
European styles of dress, language, reading and writing, and, most 
importantly, religion. By the time King Philip's War erupted, the population 
of Eliot's Praying Towns reached one-fourth of the Indians in southeastern 
New England.76 The towns were so popular that Daniel Gookin, one of the 
Massachusetts Court Assistants (a very prestigious position), was offered 
the first position as Superintendent of Indian Affairs. He accepted the offer 
and worked closely with Eliot to preserve the Praying Towns. 
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Gookin became a captain in the Massachusetts militia and 
frequently insisted that Christian Indians should accompany New England 
soldiers on military expeditions because of their vast knowledge of the 
terrain.77 During the war Eliot made every attempt to minimize persecution 
of the Praying Indians and to save his towns. As the war progressed, anti-
Indian sentiment grew. Their attempts to legitimize Christian Indians as 
non-threatening failed. Even more, colonists targeted Gookin and 
Danforth as traitors and conspirators who, for their crimes, deserved 
death. On one occasion, townspeople passed small slips of paper 
throughout the town that read. 
Reader thou art desired not to suppresse this 
paper, but to promote its designe, which is to 
certify (those traytors to their King and Countrey) 
Guggins [Gookin] and Danford [Danforth], that 
some generous spirits have vowed their 
destruction, as Christians we warne them to 
prepare for death, for though they will 
deservedly dye; yet we wish the health of their 
soules.78 
Gookin was a special target since he had power as a colonial council 
member. More than the other two, he received death threats depicting 
him as a sinner who deserved hell.79 
The hostility toward Indians resulted in their displacement onto 
reservations. On 13 October 1675, the colonial authorities at tempted to 
keep Christian Indians from the war altogether. They ordered, "all the 
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Natick Indians be forthwith sent for, & disposed of to Dear Island, as the 
place appointed for their present abode."80 Several tens of guards and 
soldiers were sent to local friendly Indian towns to supervise them.81 Any 
Indian found off of the designated reservations without a guard was to be 
apprehended and turned over to the colonial authorities. For nearly two 
months, Massachusetts and Plymouth rounded up any loyal Indian and 
placed them on constant surveillance. 
From June 1675 to February 1675/6 most colonial authorities 
believed that all Indians were dangerous. The fear of a united Indian 
alliance resulted in the persecution, and eventual internment of these 
loyal residents. As war raged through New England, Philip's forces secured 
significant victories. His successful recruitments and growing support 
worried colonists who realized that colonial forces were smaller, weaker, 
and slower than their enemy. Internally, colonists felt safer when Christian 
Indians were removed to supervised reservations; externally, however, the 
war had run much longer than expected and the colonies were running 
low on provisions and soldiers. 
THE COLONIES IN TROUBLE 
During the first half of King Philip's War, colonial authorities did their 
best to keep potentially hostile and friendly Indians from joining the war 
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effort - no matter which side they chose. After Narragansett, Agawam, 
and Nipmuck forces cast their lot with Philip, colonial authorities passed 
laws to prevent an internal rebellion amongst Christian Indians. Until 
February 1675/6, the United Colonies believed that they could win the war 
without assistance. 
Philip's forces grew stronger by the day. While the Nipmucks 
destroyed the western settlements, Narragansett forces moved toward 
Plymouth from the south. In February, Nipmuck forces took Medfield, 
Massachusetts, twenty miles outside Boston.82 Days later they were 
spotted ten miles closer.83 The Narragansetts lit Providence, Rhode Island 
aflame and quickly marched into Plymouth's territory of Rehoboth.84 
As Philip's forces grew stronger, colonial militia forces weakened. 
Originally, colonists planned their supplies for a two-month skirmish.85 As 
the war extended into November war rations and provisions ran low.86 The 
colonies hit near-famine levels twice by November.87 The Massachusetts 
Bay Colony Court wrote it was "considering the great danger of famine, 
or at least scarcity of bread & other provisions, by reason of this war."88 
Again, weeks later the Court wrote that it was still in danger of famine and 
prohibited the exportation of "fish & mackeral", and suspended the laws 
that prohibited the "importation of wheat, bisket, & flower."89 
Conditions worsened by January when authorities could not even 
get bread to their soldiers.90 Connecticut was able to supply their soldiers 
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with "som pease...[a] little wheat or at least, little bread" as "mills 
generally [failed] this winter season."91 Continued raids by Philip's forces 
destroyed settlements that would have helped feed the militia. 
Narragansett, Agawam, Nipmuck, and Wampanoag forces moved 
quickly toward Boston, Providence and Plymouth. Colonial militias, 
however, were becoming tired and hungry. 
Supplying militia companies with weapons proved difficult. By 
November, the General Court did not have sufficient weapons or 
ammunition with which to provide its soldiers. The Court ordered "that the 
committees of militia in the...towns shall hear, determine, & settle the 
whole accounts...respecting all disbursements of arms, ammunition, 
horses, furniture, provisions, &c."92 Shortly thereafter they instructed "every 
town in this jurisdiction [to] provide, as an addition to their town stock of 
ammunition, six hundred flints for one hundred of listed soldiers."93 
According to these laws, towns were now ordered to supply their 
companies with weapons and ammunition. 
With food, provisions and aid running low, Massachusetts and 
Connecticut discovered that large populations of impressed soldiers were 
not showing up for duty. In December, Massachusetts lamented, 
"because many of the soldiers now abroad, partly by wounds & partly 
[through] the severety of the Season are so far [disabled], that no present 
onset can be made upon the Grand body of the Enemy."94 Connecticut 
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failed to raise 300 men for a campaign and General Winslow ordered his 
forces to retreat from their stations because of the insufficient fighting 
company. All across New England colonial authorities instructed soldiers to 
retreat into garrisoned towns.95 
THE FEBRUARY DECLARATION 
On 21 February 1675/6 the colonial authorities in Massachusetts 
declared: 
Whereas the present war with the Indians hath so 
far exhausted the country treasury, that there is 
not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to 
effect; for the encouragement of such 
gentlemen merchants, or any other person or 
persons, that are able & willing to disburse & send 
to the public, it is hereby declared, that the 
General Court of this colony shall from time to 
time, and at all times, stand firmly obliged for the 
repayment of all & every sum or sums disbursed & 
lent for the use of the public.96 
Under these circumstances, soldiers no longer received payment for their 
services. According to Bodge, "months and even years" passed without 
soldiers "receiving all the wages owed to them."97 The February 
Declaration was a statement that the colonies failed both economically 
and militarily. 
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This marked the turning point of the war. At the Council of War on 
20 February 1675/6 Captain Benjamin Church told the colonial authorities 
that if he were allowed "50 more [soldiers]...and 100 of the Friend 
Indians...he [had] no doubt [that] he might do good Service."98 The 
Council responded, "That they were already in debt, and so big an Army 
would bring such charge upon them, that they should never be able to 
pay. And as for sending out Indians, they thought it no wayes 
advisable."99 One day later the coffers were empty and the colonies 
realized how close they were to failure. There was little food, provisions, or 
soldiers; the colonies were in debt; and according to the Declaration 
there was "not a sufficiency to prosecute the said war to effect."100 
The Council of War needed troops or Philip's forces would destroy 
Boston, Plymouth, and Hartford like they did Providence. Out of 
desperation, the Council of War turned to Indians for help. Despite their 
earlier determination to keep loyal Indians away from the conflict, they 
had no choice but to let them in - it was their only chance for survival. 
Thus, almost one week after Captain Church requested Indians for a 
campaign against the Narragansetts, the Council of War sent Captain 
Michael Peirse to march against Philip's army with "20 or 30 of the 
southern Indians."101 Peirse's co-captain was a Wampanoag Indian 
named "Captain Amos."102 
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On 25 March the company marched to Rehoboth in search of 
enemy forces. In the pursuit the Narragansetts ambushed the company 
one day later leading to the deaths of over fifty English and eleven 
friendly Indians.103 Through this mission, colonial authorities realized that 
bringing loyal Indians into the war could swell militia company numbers 
and create a buffer zone between vital locations and enemy forces. The 
shift in military philosophy was the major turning point of the war. There 
was no chance of winning the war by themselves - as the February 
Declaration proved; only with Indian reinforcements were Narragansett, 
Nipmuck, Agawam, and Wampanoag forces soon defeated. 
Days after the Peirse ambush, Plymouth authorities passed another 
order for "the number of three hundred Indians, well fitted to go forth, and 
be ready for a march by the eleventh of April next."'04 Plymouth and 
Massachusetts jointly ordered John Curtice to "take sixe Indians from 
[Deer Island] for his assistance, with their armes, some of wch Indians may 
be improved for spies as the commander in cheife shall appoint."105 When 
Captain Church returned to the war in early June, Plymouth Colony was 
"glad that Providence had brought him here at that junction" because 
"they had concluded the very next day to send out an Army of 200 Men, 
two thirds English, and one third Indians, in some measure agreeable to his 
former proposal."106 Others were instructed to take Indians in their 
companies. 
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By May, the court removed some Indians from Deer Island and 
impressed them into military service.107 Many Indians were sent as scouts 
to Medfield, Sudbury, Concord, Chelmsford, Andover, Haverill, and 
Exeter.'08 Others were employed as guides into Indian territory. When Seth 
Perry was ordered to go to the enemies and request a captive-swap, a 
friendly Indian named Tom Dublett guided him. English soldiers were 
allowed to go to Deer Island and "imploy [Indians] in scouting, labouring, 
or otherwise...to our security."109 Major Gookin and Captain Samuel 
Hunting were allowed to take seventy Indians to fight in the service of the 
colonies.110 The Natick and Pawtucket Indians were taken from Long 
Island and placed in the service of the English. Between forty to eighty 
Indians were removed from their reservations every several days and 
impressed to fight with the English.11' 
This campaign even forced colonial authorities to provide friendly 
Indians with weapons to fight the war. The court determined that no 
individual trade with Indians but also that "this law doe no way prohibbit 
the necessary supply and releife to such Indians and their families as are 
by order imployed in the country's service, or as are otherwise under the 
speciall care & inspection of authority, so that such supply & releife to 
these Indians be made as the Court or council shall allow."112 The court 
also ordered that the Treasurer now pay any Indian that served in the 
militia.1'3 
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English forces, now accompanied by "friendly" Indians, moved 
quickly against Philip's forces. There was the assumption that by 1 June 
they would be on the doorstep of Philip's territory at Mount Hope. Similarly, 
the Mohegans and Pequots fought bravely against the Narragansetts, 
and on 2 July 1676, the Mohegans, Pequots and Connecticut forces 
hailed a resounding victory over the Narragansett forces - one that left 
them crippled for the duration of the war. 
In the words of William Hubbard, the English "were necessitated...to 
return Homewards to gratify the Mohegin and Pequod Indians.""4 In a 
letter from Puritan minister Thomas Walley to John Cotton Jr., Walley wrote 
that "I am glad of the success of Benjamin Church. That it is the good fruit 
of the coming of Indians to us, those that come in are conquered and 
help to conquer others. To observe throughout the land where Indians are 
employed there hath been the greatest success if not the only success 
which is a humbling providence of God that we have so much need of 
them and cannot do our work without them."115 In another letter to the 
Connecticut Court, the General Court in Massachusetts wrote, 
but divine Providence ordering it that our forces, 
by weaknes & wants, could not atteyne that 
end, new forces were raysed, upwards of three 
hundred men, horse & foote, with forty Indians, 
committed to the conduct of Capt. Daniel 
Hinchman & severall captaines under his 
command, who since hath opportunely, by 
sending out parties, discovered the enemy by 
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our Indian scouts as fleeting up & down, and by 
a party of horse, under the command of Capt. 
Thomas Brattle, on the 5th [May], between 
Mendon & Hassansenemesit, the Indians 
discovered the enemy...kild atwenty...none of 
the troopers or scouts wounded.116 
Many scholars have missed the significance of the February 
Declaration. There are a few possible reasons for this. Douglas E. Leach 
wrote the most comprehensive history of King Philip's War. Leach says that 
his focus is on the military struggle in New England, and finds parallels 
between World War II and the seventeenth-century war."7 Though he tries 
to see both sides, he nevertheless argues that the colonists had the time, 
resources, and materials to wait out Philip's attacks. In his view the rebel 
Indians were not prepared for such a long war, and by May they were 
divided and starving.118 For Leach, this was the clear division between 
Indians and English: the English had the resources to finish the war, the 
Indians did not. His conclusion rests on the idea that Indians fell into three 
categories: enemy, neutral, or playing a small role in the English's success. 
Thus, the February Declaration, which this essay argues illustrates the 
United Colonies' failure to win the war alone, does not fit with Leach's 
view of King Philip's War. He does not recognize how depleted English 
supplies had become in January and February 1675/6. 
Nathaniel Philbrick, in his book Mayflower, priviges anecdotal 
evidence over the legislative records, and hence does not mention the 
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February Declaration.119 Philbrick excessively admires Captain Benjamin 
Church. When Church leaves the war in February because the colony 
was "already woefully in debt" and had rejected his ideas, Philbrick takes 
this at face value and moves on with his narrative.120 There is no discussion 
about why Church was denied a fighting force of friendly Indians. He 
focuses his attention on Captain Peirse who, in March 1676, was offered 
twenty Indians from Cape Cod. 
James Drake makes no mention of the February Declaration. Drake 
argues that King Philip's War was at first an internal conflict between 
colonists who believed their opponents were children that needed 
discipline until the conflict became unmanageable.121 Drake skims past 
the importance of the February Declaration - mentioning only something 
similar. "After eight months," he writes "in February 1676, the English and 
their Indian allies were at the depths of despair."122 How deep was this 
despair, he does not say. Additionally, Drake argues that "Indians played 
a large role in putting down Philip's rebellion."123 He does not, however, 
explain why the Massachusetts and Plymouth colonies removed an 
internment policy that, in February, led to the employment of Indians in 
the colonial companies. 
In f a c t many scholars do not even address the issue of exhausted 
treasuries in Massachusetts and Plymouth. Russell Bourne quotes Benjamin 
Church's Entertaining Passages, but does not explore it further; Jenny Hale 
69 
Pulsipher argues that in February 1676, soldiers were dissatisfied "with how 
the war was being waged" and explains it by discussing the military 
ranking system; Daniel Mandell writes that by February 1676, "some towns 
in Massachusetts reported that nearly 50 percent of those called to 
service refused to appear. Others deserted after joining."124 Mandell 
makes no mention of the economic stresses, and argues that the reason 
for this was the internal conflicts between soldiers and the government of 
Massachusetts.125 
All of these authors miss the importance of the February Declaration 
as a symbol of failure. Economically, Stephen Webb writes, the New 
England commonwealths did not recover from King Philip's War until a 
century later.126 He writes, not "for a century would the per-capita wealth 
of their colonists recover its pre-1676 level."127 The colonies had no money 
to pay troops or supply them with food and provisions. Fortifications in the 
west were abandoned because soldiers' supplies ran too low. 
Of the authors who argue that the Mohawks played an important 
role in the war's outcome, only Webb discusses their role in relation to 
what he calls the period of "devastation, demoralization, [and] 
dependence."128 Webb argues that these factors and the Mohawk raids 
were interrelated as early as February.129 The colonies feared that if, 
during their time of "devestation" and "demoralization", they turned to 
Governor-General Andros and asked his Mohawk allies to attack the 
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Wampanoag the English Crown would have a stake in New England -
ending the United Colonies' pseudo-independence.130 Nevertheless, the 
colonies had no choice and as Webb writes, "The Mohegan[s]...pressed 
the Boston (and Connecticut) magistrates to accept this proposal by 
Governor-General Andros, 'affirming that the said Mohauks were the only 
Persons likely to put an end to the War, by hindering the Enemy from 
Planting; and forcing them down upon us."131 With few other choices, the 
colonies reluctantly accepted their "dependence." 
PHILIP'S EXECUTIONER 
On 12 August 1676, Philip's forces retreated to Mount Hope. His 
pursuers were Captain Benjamin Church, Major Savage, and a company 
of English and Indians. At the advice of his Indians, Church's company 
combed the swamp and found Philip reloading his gun. In shock, Philip 
threw away his weapon and ran into an ambush. He was shot in the chest 
twice and fell face down in the mud. The Indian who shot him, John 
Alderman, quietly escorted Captain Church to the place from where the 
shot was heard. Church and his company stood over the corpse in awe 
He then instructed an Indian to quarter Philip's body and hang the 
remains from a tree.132 
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Church returned to his army group to relay the news: the war was 
over; Philip was dead. Soldiers cheered and rejoiced at the news. Days of 
fasting and thanksgiving commemorated the victory and acknowledged 
the sacrifices made for the safety of the colonies.133 Thus, on 12 August 
1676 John Alderman was hailed a hero. Alderman was an Indian who 
ended the war that the colonies nearly lost. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter offered a reexamination of the turning point of the war. 
It argues that colonial military success between April and August 1676 was 
the result the introduction of Indians into the war. The February 
Declaration of 1675/6 illustrates the United Colonies' total economic and 
military failure. It also shows that as Philip's forces grew stronger between 
January and February 1675/6, the colonists became weaker. Facing 
annihilation, the colonists enlisted the help of friendly Indians - a group 
that they tried to keep out of the war for eight months. Daniel Gookin, 
who probably relished the fact that he was right all along, argued that the 
Indians acted "as a living wall."134 The argument presented here is one 
that emphasized the colonial desperation during the war; or rather that 
colonial forces had no other choice but to take a risk and admit Indians 
into their militias. This led the colonists to victory in August 1676. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE "SKULKING WAY OF WAR" 
The outbreak of King Philip's War in June 1675 forced a collision 
between two different military styles. In New England, colonists depended 
on a European-style phalanx configuration.1 Central to the military 
literature produced in Europe and America during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries was an insistence on a stationary army controlled 
by a rigid formation. This literature also included advice on how to wield 
large or heavy weapons such as pikes, harquebuses, matchlocks, or 
flintlocks. Thus, heavy weapons and a relatively immobile army proved 
effective in Europe where all armies, with few exceptions, used this military 
structure. 
In contrast, Indian warfare tactics relied on skulking, which was an 
unpredictable, quick, and effective practice in New England's densely 
wooded forests.2 Before the arrival of Europeans, Indians fought with 
bows, arrows, and tomahawks. These weapons were small, easily 
portable, and allowed Indians the advantage of neither being seen nor 
heard by their enemy. As trade expanded between Indians and 
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European colonists, the former acquired firearms. Yet, rather than adjust 
their military style, Indians combined their speed and stealth with the 
weapon's power. 
A confrontation between these military cultures emerged in 1675. 
This chapter will first consider the differences between Indian and English 
military ideas, philosophies, and strategies. It will then argue that during 
the first half of King Philip's War, the English refused to adopt skulking into 
their military system for fear that they would lose their civilized identity. Yet 
because European-style methods had little success against Indian skulking 
tactics, colonial forces, during the first half of the war, spent time, effort, 
and money fighting an enemy they could not see, hear, or fight. 
Those that opposed the use of skulking tactics by colonial forces 
soon awakened to New England in shambles, and their lives on the line. 
As a result, the colonists discarded their familiar military methods for 
skulking. When the colonies adopted skulking practices, Wampanoag, 
Narragansett and Nipmuck forces could no longer use the woods and 
swamps as escape routes. This chapter concludes by arguing that the 
colonial victory against Philip's forces relied on the reluctant adoption of 
Indian skulking practices in late February 1675/6 as a last effort to hold off 
their defeat at the hands of Philip's forces. 
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ENGLISH MILITARY STRUCTURE 
Old World military tactics and strategies were familiar to 
seventeenth-century New England colonists. Nearly every able-bodied 
man was aware of the military literature produced in English during this 
period.3 
The literature included a wide spectrum of fighting techniques. Texts 
discussed the application of weapons, rank, etiquette, fortification, and 
"the quality of horses suitable for heavy cavalry...to that adequate for 
dragoons."4 In 1639, William Barriffe's Military Discipline or the Yong Artillery 
Man offered step-by-step instructions on the proper way to hold a musket 
and pike while marching to the "beats of the Drum" which he called "the 
voice of the Commander, the spurre of the valiant, and the heart of the 
coward."5 John Cruso, in his Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie, 
instructed officers on how to gather strategic intelligence and the 
acceptable way to meet an enemy in the field.6 Henry Hexham, in 1634, 
wrote The Principles of the Art Militarie, in which he detailed European 
military strategies with visual imagery - presumably for illiterate soldiers.7 
According to Barbara Donagan, no "aspect of war escaped these 
military authors of the earlier seventeenth century."8 
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Central to the literature was an emphasis on proper behavior, 
formation, and weapon control for an army or companies within an army. 
Diagrams and texts instructed soldiers on the proper formation of musket-
men and pike-men. According to Barriffe, "When we instruct our Soldiers 
how to face Square" it "be very necessary for young Souldiers to move 10. 
or 12. paces upon every motion of facings."9 In formation, each soldier in 
rank was instructed to stand six feet apart, three feet apart, or one foot 
apart, depending on the enemy's distance.10 Men bearing muskets faced 
"right and left" while pike-men split into two groups and stood at the front 
and rear of the formation facing the opposite direction.11 These pike-men, 
according to one source, should be "armed with a head-piece, a Curace 
and Tases defensive, & with a Pike of fifteene foot long, and a Rapier 
offensive."12 In a sixteen-step diagram, musketeers were instructed on how 
to discharge a musket beginning with its placement on a support stand, 
then firing the weapon, and finally resting it on one's shoulder.13 The 
reliance on tactical formation, muskets, rapiers, and pikes, were the most 
common topics of English and European military literature.14 
THE COLONIAL MILITIA 
Until 1675, the New England militias mirrored their English 
counterpart. Colonists were organized into small divisions of civilian soldiers 
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known as trainbands.15 In Massachusetts, every male colonist, age sixteen 
or older, was required to participate in military exercises once every three 
years, for six days at a time.16 Drills consisted of a mixture of formation 
maneuvers, weapons training, and proper military behavior.17 Laws 
instructed military officers to ensure that "their Souldiers be well and 
compleatly Armed...with...two thirds of each Company be Musquetiers, 
and those which serve with Pikes, have Corsets and head-peices."18 Each 
trainband was taught the basics of handling a sword, the correct posture 
for holding a pike, firing a musket, and how to wear protective armor 
properly.19 Finally, and most importantly, the militia was instructed to 
march in formation to the beat of a drum while calling the enemy into an 
open "champion field."20 
Early New England settlers relied heavily on men with English military 
backgrounds for protection. Settlers at Plymouth brought with them Miles 
Standish, a professional soldier, for fear that in America the English would 
be "in continual danger of the savage people."21 Standish had been a 
mercenary soldier in the Low Countries for Queen Elizabeth's army, and 
was no doubt well trained in English military customs.22 John Underhill and 
John Mason arrived in America shortly after the first settlement. These two 
were "schooled in England's wars on the Continent and in Ireland."23 
Military commanders derived their manner of fighting from the 
European and English methods.24 Standish, Underhill, and Mason brought 
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Old World warfare notions to America. In Plymouth, Standish trained the 
residents in the proper use of "Swords, Rapiers, and all other piercing 
weapons" commonly used by the English and Europeans.25 During the 
1637 Pequot War, Underhill and Mason marched to Fort Saybrook in 
formation as one man "beat up the drum" and another flew the colonial 
flag ahead.2 6 Underhill acknowledged that the his company "chose to 
beat up the Drum and bid them [Indians] into battell, marching into a 
champion field."27 He waited in the field while the army "displayed our 
colours." He soon realized that none of the Indians "would come neare 
us."28 Annoyed at this blatant disregard for his military custom, Underhill 
burned their Wigwams, destroyed their crops, and for several days stole 
their food.29 As the war proceeded, small ambushes by Pequot warriors 
forced Underhill to "subdivide our divisions" into smaller units.30 These 
regiments fought in "tight formations" while "militiamen marched about 
'in rank and file'" and displayed their muskets and pikes.31 
New England colonists and English citizens were aware of the social, 
cultural, and economic effects of war. Reports from the continent helped 
develop a sense of proper wartime etiquette. Between 1618 and 1648, 
conflict in Hapsburg, Germany tore the country apart in what the English 
believed the most barbaric ways.32 Eyewitness reports contained detailed 
accounts of soldiers beating "out the braines of poore old decrepid 
women, as in sport" and "poore people...slaine before anothers face."33 
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The Thirty Years War, as it is now known, illustrated the "uncivilized" 
devastation caused by unregulated wars. English people used the Thirty 
Years War to reinforce formal etiquette for wartime.34 
INDIAN FIGHTING TACTICS 
Indian warfare differed from the European custom in a number of 
ways and they fought to accomplish a variety of outcomes. Customarily 
Indians fought wars "to settle boundary disputes, avenge insults, and 
extend or resist tribal authority."35 Indians often warred against other 
villages for three reasons: "valor,' 'revenge,' and to acquire captives."36 
Recently, Daniel Richter has shown that Indians initiated small-scale wars 
through a practice called "mourning-war" where a bereaved community 
raided another community to replace a member killed in war.37 Unlike 
Europeans, Indians rarely fought over economic and political issues. 
Furthermore, warfare objectives were not Clausewitzian, meaning satisfied 
by total extermination of one side or the other.38 Warfare was not a 
"continual struggle to complete victory"; nor was it intended to dominate 
the enemy "normally associated with European-style conquest."39 
Until the arrival of European traders, Indians fought with lightweight 
weapons, which allowed for quick and stealthy movements through 
densely wooded areas. William Wood, in 1634, noted that they "use no 
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other weapon in war than bows and arrows."40 These weapons catered to 
a strategy much different from the European style tactics. In his 
observation, Wood argued that there were significant military differences 
between Indians and Europeans. The "warriors make towards their 
enemies in a disordered manner, without any soldier-like marching or 
warlike postures, being deaf to any word of command, ignorant of falling 
off or falling on, doubling ranks or files."41 
As European traders established better relations with Indians, the 
latter acquired muskets, powder, and shot. Indians found that although 
muskets were heavier than bows, they were still as quick and "generally 
excellent marksmen."42 Contemporary authors noted how quickly and 
quietly Indians moved through the woods. In 1674, John Josselyn observed 
that they fought by "ambushments and surprises, coming upon one 
another unawares."43 The adoption of European muskets, and the quiet 
skulking practices of Indians, frightened colonists who believed that 
Indians might find a way to manufacture gunpowder and drive the English 
from the continent.44 
OBSERVATIONS OF EACH OTHER 
Colonists came to America with preconceived notions of how wars 
should be fought.45 Since Indian warfare fit into the "uncivilized" category, 
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colonists were reluctant to adopt skulking until, in King Philip's War, it 
became absolutely necessary. The success of the Pequot War in 1638 
reinforced the colonists' admiration for their own military philosophy. 
Colonial militias followed the European norms that governed how 
wars should be fought, when they should be fought, "what weapons and 
tactics are permissible, whom among the enemy it is appropriate to 
kill...and what conventions [should be] observed."46 Outside of these 
conventions were cannibalism and torture, which were practiced by 
Indians. Eyewitness accounts of these practices during wartime frightened 
colonists. 
Indian habits that fit European notions of "savagery" and 
"barbarism" were described with derision.47 In 1636, Jean de Brebeuf 
wrote that the Hurons captured and tortured enemy combatants for "Five 
or six days."48 The Hurons spent this period "burning the prisoners over a 
slow fire, and not satisfied with seeing their skins entirely roasted, they cut 
open the legs, the thighs, the arms, and the most fleshy part of the body 
and thrust into the wounds glowing brands or red-hot hatchets."49 In New 
England, Increase Mather wrote of a similar incident. After the 
Wampanoags destroyed the town of Sudbury on 20 April 1676 
they took five or six of the English and carried 
them away alive, but that night killed them in 
such a manner as none but Salvages would have 
done. For they stripped them naked, and caused 
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them to run the Gauntlet, whipping them after a 
cruel and bloudy manner, and then threw hot 
ashes upon them, cut out the flesh of their legs, 
and put fire into their wounds.50 
Mather concluded, "they are the perfect children of the Devill."51 
Thomas Abler acknowledges that while "we do not have as many 
comments concerning Indians' views of the European method of waging 
war" it "seems incontestable that many European conventions and 
practices would seem as barbaric to Indians as Indian practices did to 
Europeans."52 One of these practices was total war. After John Underhill 
and John Mason lit the Pequot camp of Saybrook Fort in Mystic, 
Connecticut aflame during the Pequot War, friendly Narragansett fighters 
screamed, "mach it, mach it, that is, it is naught, it is naught, because it is 
too furious, and slaies too many men."53 The Saybrook Fort was decimated 
within half an hour and contemporary estimates reported between four 
and "six hundred Indian souls" were "brought...to hell" on that fateful 
day."54 Those that escaped the fire were butchered with English swords.55 
Young men, who had never experienced warfare firsthand were shocked 
by the carnage and noted carcasses "so thicke in some places, that you 
could hardly passe along."56 
Colonial soldiers also judged Indian strategy as strange, 
unimpressive and uneffective. After Underhill obliterated the Pequot 
forces he sent his Mohegan allies into Pequot territory so "that we might 
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see the nature of Indian war."57 After observing for some time, Underhill 
hyperbolically remarked that the Mohegans "might fight seven yeares 
and not kill seven men."58 To his surprise, the Indians "came not neere one 
another, but shot remote, and not point blanke, as wee often doe with 
our bullets."59 Fighting, he believed, "is more for pastime, than to conquer 
and subdue enemies."60 The English hardly considered this method of 
combat warlike since "the [Indians] fight farre differs from the Christian 
practice."61 John Mason suggested that their fighting "did hardly deserve 
the Name of Fighting."62 Roger Williams, five years after the Pequot War 
ended, reiterated Underfill's observations. Williams wrote of the 
Narragansetts, with whom he had familiar relations, 
Their Warres are farre lesse bloudy, and 
devouring then the cruell Warres of Europe; and 
seldome twenty slaine in a pitcht field : partly 
because when they fight in a wood every Tree is 
a Bucklar [shield]. When they fight in a plaine, 
they fight with leaping and dancing, that 
seldome an Arrow hits, and when a man is 
wounded, unlesse he that shot followes upon the 
wounded, they soone retire and save the 
wounded :and yet having no Swords, nor Guns, 
all that are slaine are commonly salin with great 
Valour and Courage : for the Conquerour 
ventures into the thickest, and brings away the 
Head of his Enemy.63 
Military leaders believed that skulking was futile against English tactical 
superiority and failed to see "the sophistication and military effectiveness" 
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of Indian practices.64 The belief that their military strategy was superior 
during much of the seventeenth century kept them from adopting a 
skulking strategy. 
Thomas Abler believes that the evidence points to the likelihood 
that colonists used rape in war.65 In 1672, The General Laws and Liberties 
of the Massachusetts Colony condemned the practice of rape in war.66 
This might have been a case of prevention, rather than reaction, but it 
does indicate that the problem was on the minds of colonists. Rape 
warfare might have shocked Indians, since it did not fall into their 
philosophy of acceptable conduct. 
There are no reported cases of captivity-rape by Indians during the 
seventeenth century.67 When Nipmuck forces captured Mary Rowlandson 
at Lancaster on 10 February 1675/6, Rowlandson spent nearly three 
months with the Indians. She was eventually ransomed in May 1676 for £20 
and wrote a narrative of her experiences. In The Sovereignty and 
Goodness of God, she emphasized, "not one of them ever offered me the 
least abuse of unchastity to me, in word or action."68 James Axtell argues 
that rape perhaps did not occur among Indian communities because 
many female captives were adopted into the community to fill familial 
roles.69 Quinnapin, the Nipmuck sachem, perhaps saw her as an individual 
who could fulfill the duties of a woman in the clan.70 
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A COLD WAR 
Between the Pequot War and King Philip's War, colonial militias did 
not change their battlefield strategies. In the relative peace of the mid-
century decades, there was no incentive to drive transformation. After the 
successes of the first war, colonists assumed that the European-style 
system was more effective than Indian skulking. Kyle Zelner argues that 
colonial authorities paid little attention to developing a new model army 
for fear that it "would tarnish their image" as civilized Englishmen.71 The 
cold war between the two cultures allowed colonial authorities to 
manage Indian relations through diplomatic agreements rather than 
military engagement. When these agreements failed at the outbreak of 
King Philip's War, the colonies fell back on a military system that had rarely 
been tested by the realities of New England as battleground. 
Economic prosperity between 1640 and 1670 enabled colonists to 
move farther into the backcountry. In five years, 1637 to 1642, Boston 
authorities purchased roughly 129 grants for an average of four acres per 
household.72 By 1660, colonial towns grew at about one town per year -
expansion limited only by the competing claims of rival colonies.73 Settlers 
brought livestock with them for survival. According to Virginia DeJohn 
Anderson, as early as 1634, towns gauged their prosperity by the size of 
their herds.74 Because towns depended so heavily on livestock, "New 
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Englanders reversed the usual English fencing practices" which allowed 
animals to roam into Indian territories and damage crops.75 
For protection against encroachments many Indian communities 
submitted themselves to English common law with the expectation that 
they would be protected from wandering livestock.76 Because of the 
success of settlements in the backcountry, seventeenth-century "settlers 
no longer needed the friendship of Indians."77 As a result, laws were 
passed that did not recognize "the fundamental incompatibility of English 
and Indian subsistence regimes," and "colonial authorities repeatedly 
permitted joint use of land."78 As James Drake argues, King Philip's War 
began because of the colonial authorities' inability to fulfill their reciprocal 
responsibility to protect Indian property.79 Without a sound compromise 
between 1636 and 1675 based on mutual respect and reciprocation both 
sides became frustrated. 
Even as Philip made preparations for war, the colonies continued 
their push for the diplomatic relations that had divided the two cultures. 
Philip was called to Massachusetts and Plymouth a total of thirteen times 
between 1662 and 1671 to account for rumors of conspiracy.80 In 1671, 
Philip appeared before a council in Taunton where he signed an 
agreement that forfeited his authority and surrendered his weapons to the 
colonial authorities.81 The sachem was infuriated by this blatant disregard 
for his authority. The colonial authorities, however, hoped that Philip's 
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ambitious troublemaking would end with this agreement.82 When it 
appeared that Philip was preparing for war, Plymouth organized its forces 
and Rhode Island offered its support.83 
THE FIRST EIGHT MONTHS OF OPEN WAR 
Because the colonial militia depended on Old World etiquette and 
strategy during the first half of the war, Indians often obliterated 
settlements, livestock, and settlers with little or no resistance.84 Frightened, 
angry colonists often described Indian skulking tactics in insulting terms. 
Nathaniel Saltonstall called Indians, "Wolves" who would "dare not come 
foth out of the Woods and Swamps" to fight properly.85 Similarly, other 
colonists who experienced the destruction of their homes, farms and 
communities emphasized similarities between the pernicious skulking of 
Indian warfare and the devil's work.86 Through the winter months of 1675, 
the colonial militia gradually modified its military strategy and system to 
combat Indian skulking. In March 1675/6, the colonial militias were losing 
the war. To save themselves they reluctantly adopted skulking tactics. This 
tactical transformation contributed significantly to the colonial victory on 
12 August 1676. 
Seven or eight of Philip's men arrived in Swansea on 20 June 1675. 
When an Englishman refused to sharpen their hatchets because "it was 
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the Sabbath Day, and their God would be very angry if he should let them 
do it" the Indians became angry.87 To show their irritation, they broke into 
another's house and stole some food. After they finished, they turned their 
attention to a man walking down the road, whom they took captive for a 
short time.88 Swansea residents panicked and quickly sent a message to 
Plymouth and Boston for help. When Governor John Leverett of 
Massachusetts received this letter he ordered that the drums be beaten 
to signal war. In "three House time" Massachusetts "Mustered up about an 
Hundred and ten Men."89 The other settlements - Plymouth, Connecticut, 
and Rhode Island - joined the charge and spent several days enlisting 
volunteers for the militia.90 
Trouble in Swansea escalated, and more Wampanoag warriors 
provoked the settlers.91 For several hours, Wampanoag men harassed the 
towns' residents until a young man shot an Indian dead. This was exactly 
the excuse Philip needed to declare war against the colonies. 
One day later, the Indians attacked Swansea, killed the young 
man, his father, and "five more English."92 One account of this event 
wrote that 
They took [a woman]...skinned her Head, as also 
the Son, and dismist them both, who immediately 
died. They also, the next day killed six or seven 
Men...and two more at one of the Garrisons; and 
as two Men that went out of one of the Garrisons 
to draw a Bucket of Water, were shot and 
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carried away, and afterwards found with their 
Fingers and Feet cut off, and the skin of their 
Heads slayed off.93 
Colonial forces arrived and "found divers English Murthered on the Road, 
and were informed by the English there, of divers Hostilities of the 
Indians."94 Swansea was destroyed, and eventually abandoned. In only a 
few days Philip had shown the crushing power of Wampanoag forces. 
The English forces were not prepared for combat in densely 
wooded areas. They neither knew, nor wanted to know, how to maneuver 
through the forests. Instead, one Massachusetts Captain, Samuel Mosely, 
used "several Dogs" to find the Indians in the swamps.95 When Plymouth 
engaged their enemy on 29 June, Wampanoag warriors shot and 
wounded a large portion of colonial forces and killed the commander. 
When the English at tempted retaliation the Indians "ran into Swamps" and 
prevented "a further pursuit of the Enemy."96 Increase Mather wrote that 
when the Indians used the natural resources to their advantage "nothing 
could be done against the Enemy."97 Nathaniel Saltonstall echoed 
Mather's observation when he wrote that the Indians behaved 
Like Wolves, and other Beasts of Prey, that 
commonly do their Mischiefs in the Night, or by 
Stealth, [and] dare not come forth out of the 
Woods and Swamps, where they lay skulking in 
small Companies, being so light of Foot that they 
can run away when they [wish], and pass Bogs, 
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rocky Mountains, where we could by no Means 
pursue them.98 
Even when colonial forces followed Indians into the woods they 
were incompetent. Mather reported that they "sometimes unhappily 
shoot English men instead of Indians."99 As a result. Lieutenant Phineas 
Upham begged the Massachusetts authorities for soldiers "acquainted 
with the woods" because his soldiers dared not to pursue their enemy. The 
colonial militias were unprepared for warfare in the swamps, and officers 
realized that they were unprepared for combat in the swamps and thus 
risked "away Mens lives."100 
On 18 July, Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth forces combined their 
efforts to seek out the Indians in the swamps. Not knowing where their 
enemy lay, colonial soldiers shot at "every Bush they see move (supposing 
the Indians were there)."101 Wasted ammunition became a problem for 
New England forces, as they aimlessly shot at anything that moved. 
Powder was not cheap. Though the first gunpowder mill was constructed 
in 1675 colonists still imported brimstone and saltpeter.102 
The successes of Indian ambushes showed how poor the English 
were at detecting Philip's forces. When Captain Thomas Lathrop and 
eighty of his men transported "cartloads of goods near Deerfield, 
Massachusetts" an Indian company ran out of the swamp and killed 
seventy men.103 On 2 August, Nipmuck forces, now allied with the 
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Wampanoags, surprise attacked Captain Hutchinson's company in 
Brookfield. Indian forces left the town smoldering after they "wrapped 
special arrows with rags containing brimstone and 'wild fire" and shot 
them into houses.104 Reports of "travelers being waylaid" while walking 
through towns forced many to relocate closer to Boston.105 Increase 
Mather noted that Indians knew "where to find us, but we know not where 
to find them."106 
Philip moved quickly. The success of his forces rested on their ability 
to avoid "block-houses and instead hit isolated farms. The English, secure 
in their block houses, could do little more than watch as the Indians 
devastated their farms."107 In Taunton, colonists' best attempts to catch 
Philip's forces by erecting forts were foiled. Instead, Philip led his forces 
across a water passage into a swamp and escaped capture.108 
When colonial forces placed another trap for Philip on 30 July, Philip 
"slipped past the area's troops" and attacked into central New 
England.109 From here, Philip's forces and Nipmuck forces combined to 
destroy the towns of Brookfield, Taunton, Bridgewater, and Dartmouth. 
Before any news of their whereabouts reached other militia 
companies, the Indians struck Northfield. When Major Robert Treat realized 
that Philip's forces had moved further west, they pursued, "leaving cattle 
there and even soldiers' corpses unburied".110 Similarly, Major Pynchon 
received news that Philip's forces intended to attack Hadley, 
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Massachusetts in October 1675. Pynchon and a company of 190 soldiers 
rushed to Hadley "only to find the town in flames, and the Indians fled."111 
John Easton wrote that soldiers spent weeks searching the coastlines for 
Philip while they waited for information about Philip's next attack.112 
Virginia DeJohn Anderson has shown that when Indians raided 
towns at the beginning of the war, they specifically targeted livestock.113 
According to Anderson "livestock had come to symbolize the relentless 
advance of English settlement."114 Very rarely did Indians consume the 
animals, but rather they tortured them by cutting legs, intestines, and 
pulling out eyes.115 By focusing on the slaughter of animals, Anderson 
argues, Indians were sending "a message of terror to their enemies."116 
Though Anderson's argument is sound, she does not consider the 
strategic importance of killing English livestock in New England. Philip, by 
1675, was well aware that colonists relied on livestock for sustenance.117 In 
an attempt to starve the colonists into submission, Philip, according to one 
account, had killed "eight thousand head of Cattle" in the first seven 
months.118 Each town the Indians raided cost the inhabitants hundreds of 
horses and cattle - essentially debilitating towns and forcing the 
inhabitants to leave. Providence lost "neer a hundred cattell", while areas 
along the border of Rhode Island and Massachusetts lost "at the least a 
thousand horses &...two thousand Cattell And many Sheep."119 
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As the war progressed, coastal towns had little food to give its 
soldiers in the backcountry. In some circumstance, company units arrived 
into towns to find it destroyed. Often stayed "thereabouts till they have 
eaten and consumed what stock of Cattle or Sheep the Indians had 
left "120 while the colonial army foraged for food, Philip's forces attacked 
other towns and settlements.121 The Indian forces strategically debilitated 
entire militia companies by destroying their crops, livestock, and shelter 
with unpredictable raids. Colonial fighters were too slow, too weak, and 
too hungry to protect themselves from Philip's forces and settlements fell 
like dominos.122 
When the first generation of soldiers who had fought in the Pequot 
War died, they left the subsequent generations unprepared for military 
combat. The first generation consisted of Underhill and Mason who died in 
1672; Lion Gardiner in 1663; and Endecott in 1665.123 This new generation 
consisted of Captain Samuel Mosely, a former privateer in Jamaica, Major 
Thomas Savage, who, although never engaging in armed conflict was 
Boston's militia captain from 1652 to 1682, and various landowners that 
were elected officers by their town.124 The infantry, furthermore, was made 
up of all volunteers who had no other experience with war than the 
triennial military drills that taught them how to use Old World weapons.125 
Thus, this generation of New England soldiers had remarkably little 
experience fighting as wartime combatants. 
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BENJAMIN CHURCH AND THE WRONG TYPE OF WAR 
Early in the war, one soldier in particular, realized the inefficiency of 
Old World tactics. Church was raised in a military family after his father, 
Richard Church, fought with the colonists in the Pequot War. Because of 
his service in the colony, Richard's name shows up on the 1643 Plymouth 
Colony list of men able to bear arms.126 Captain Church was, thus, well 
trained in military weaponry of the seventeenth century. Yet what made 
Captain Church stand out among other colonial fighters was his ability to 
adopt Indian skulking tactics early in the war. 
In 1674, Captain Church moved from Duxbury to Sogkonate (now 
known as Little Compton, Rhode Island). During the seventeenth century 
Plymouth Colony purchased the area from the Indians. In all likelihood, 
Church's wife Alice Southworth's grandmother and step-grandfather, 
Alice Carpenter and Governor William Bradford, purchased the area and 
it was passed down through the generations. But Church was the first 
colonist to move to Sogkonate and soon gained "good acquantance 
with the Natives...and was in a little time in great esteem among them."127 
In particular, Captain Church took a familial liking to the Indian sachem 
Awashonks and her people, the Sogkonates. His kindness to Awashonks 
and her people earned their trust. 
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Church never explained how he came to recognize the 
effectiveness of skulking - other than that it worked - but we can deduce 
from his narrative Entertaining Passages that his willingness to adopt 
Indians into his company at an early stage played a significant role. One 
historian believes that Church's 
openness to human relationships with Indians 
made Church capable of learning from them. It 
was this quality that made him successful in 
partisan warfare. Unlike the regular soldiery, 
Church learned from Indians how to fight Indians, 
and since he also knew how to recognize and 
evoke the humanity of the Indians, he was able 
to bring personal influence to bear in diplomacy 
and in recruiting Indians to fight against King 
Philip.128 
When war broke out in 1675, the Plymouth government recruited 
Church. During the early stages of the war he met fierce resistance to his 
adoption of Indian tactics. When he insisted that he could take a 
company of his best men to surprise an Indian war party, the ranking 
officer told Church his methods were f lawed and the orders were to "go 
to Mount-hope and there to fight Philip" openly.129 After the Great Swamp 
Fight of December 1675, Church recommended that since the militia 
companies had driven the Indians from the swamps English forces should 
stay in the Narragansett wigwams for the night. He argued that since the 
"Wigwams were Musket-proof" and "Sufficient to supply the whole Army" 
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with "a good warm House to lodge in," they would surely protect the 
soldiers from "the Storms and Cold." Another ranking officer believed that 
instead the wigwams should be burned. The company doctor sided with 
the latter who, while operating on a bullet wound in Church's leg, told him 
"if he gave such advice as" to stay in the wigwams for the night "he 
should [let him] bleed to Death like a Dog."130 
There is no doubt that Church's ability to cross between worlds (to 
sleep one night in a house, and one night in a wigwam) worried colonists. 
Solomon Stoddard commented that if those that used skulking tactics 
"act like wolves" they are to be "dealt withall as wolves."131 
Thus, Church encountered heavy resistance when he met with the 
Council of War in February 1676. Church recommended "he...take the 
Command of Men" and "not lye in any Town or Garrison with them, 
but...lye in the Woods as the Enemy did."132 This, as well as his argument 
that "they must make a business of the War, as the Enemy did" was 
rejected as "no wayes advisable."133 William Hubbard, writing about King 
Philip's War in 1677 wrote that the early failures of colonial troops occurred 
because they took "up a wrong Notion about the best Way and manner 
of fighting with the Indians...that [they believed] it were best to deal with 
the Indians in their own Way."134 
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TWO CHOICES 
Holding onto Old World military tactics for fear that they would lose 
their identity proved costly. English colonists realized early in the war that if 
they admitted that Indian warfare was strategically advanced - and 
adopted it - they would become victims of the wilderness.135 As a result, 
the colonies suffered the heaviest damage between September 1675 and 
February 1675/6. By February, the situation in New England was dire. 
Deerfield, Northfield, Swansea, Hatfield, Hadley, Springfield, Rehoboth, 
Providence, Wrentham, Marlborough, and many other towns were 
attacked, pillaged or burned to the ground.136 Additionally, thousands of 
homes were decimated.137 
Philip's forces pressed forward until, by February 1676, they had 
destroyed towns like Chelmsford, Medfield, Scituate, and Weymouth. The 
town of Medfield was "just twenty miles from Boston."138 Days later, "Indian 
raids came within ten miles of the town."139 Providence, Rhode Island rose 
up in flames and everything south of Pawtucket, Rhode Island was 
abandoned. Massachusetts' residents fled burning towns for protection 
closer to Boston and Plymouth.140 
Officials in Boston planned for the worst. Their idea: build a 
fortification around Boston "from the head of navigation on the Charles 
River to a point on the Concord River in the town of Billerica."141 In upper 
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Connecticut, inhabitants and soldiers crowded into the only homes left 
standing, going days without food or protection.142 
Even with much of New England in flames, the colonies continued 
to hold onto their Old World military style. Thus, colonial forces continued 
to make costly mistakes and experienced devastating losses. During a 
campaign in Connecticut, "one of the English soldiers wore squeaking 
shoes" and an Indian guide refused to march forward until the soldier 
replaced his shoes with a pair of moccasins. Another soldier "wore a pair 
of leather breeches which being dry made a rustling noise, which the 
Indian objected to" and halted the procedure "until the breeches were 
either removed or soaked in water, to prevent the rustling."143 During an 
expedition in 1675, militias were still holding up the emblematic "Colours in 
the Front of [their] Company."'44 
The colonists needed to make a choice: continue fighting as their 
ancestors had and lose the war (which meant losing everything), or learn 
from the Indians a new method of fighting. With the former the colonists 
would have lost their lives, the latter, their link to the past. For fifty years, 
colonists spent time, energy, and money pulling the Indians out of the 
wilderness; by 1676, the Indians successfully pulled the English into the 
wilderness. The colonists' existential choice to live meant there was no 
turning back to the past for help. 
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TURNING POINT OF THE WAR: ADOPTION OF INDIAN TACTICS 
Reluctantly, colonists made the choice to adopt Indian tactical 
methods. Between October 1675 and December 1676 the colonies 
began modifying their strategy. On 13 October 1675, colonial authorities 
announced, "Whereas it is found by experience that troopers & pikemen 
are of little use in the present war with the Indians" the militia "shall 
forthwith furnish themselves with carbines and ammunition...to serve as 
foot soldiers during the said war."145 Pikemen were "practically worthless in 
the forest because they lacked knowledgeable guides and perceptive 
scouts" during the early stages of the war.146 Slowly the colonial military 
realized that the only way to win a war against the Indians was to learn 
how to fight like them. 
Scholars have underemphasized this last point. Douglas E. Leach 
and Patrick Malone argue that that Philip's forces never stood a chance 
against the colonial army. Leach argues that Philip's forces lost because 
they were ill prepared for a long-term struggle. Throughout Flintlock & 
Tomahawk, Leach maintains that Indian attacks were merely "setbacks" 
to colonial forces, and that English forces realized they could end the war 
by attacking Indian crops by the winter of 1676.147 For Leach, spring 
harvests enabled colonists to "carry on the war almost indefinitely while 
the Indians continued to use up their very limited resources."148 In this view, 
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the colonists' wore out the Indians out by protracting the war and burning 
Philip's means of sustenance.149 
Malone, similarly, explains King Philip's War as a war decided by 
attrition and technological superiority.150 Malone argues that Indian 
tactics "were not enough to win a war against the far more numerous 
colonists, whose Indian allies, fortified garrison houses, and almost 
unlimited logistical support."151 Colonists, accordingly, had better firearms, 
protection, food-storage, and a larger population that Indians had no 
chance of driving off the land. No matter how hard or long the Indians 
fought against the colonists, the colonial militia always had the upper 
hand. As a result, the longer the Indians fought, the more they suffered 
"disease, starvation, lack of ammunition, and relentless pursuit" of their 
enemies.152 For both Malone and Leach, Philip's forces faced inevitable 
defeat from the moment they attacked Swansea. 
James Drake, who has made extraordinary strides in our 
understanding of King Philip's War, also argues that Philip's forces lost due 
to internal divisions and a failed unification between all Indians. Though 
the colonies were divided at first, their success materialized as colonies 
unified through the dehumanization of Indians, unification of religion and 
culture, and their resolve to fight.153 
Still others emphasize the role that Mohawk raids played on the 
war's outcome of the war.154 Daniel R. Mandell claims that rather than 
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fight a two-pronged war against the Mohawks and English, Philip's forces 
surrendered to the English. When the English offered amnesty to all Indians 
that had not engaged in heinous attacks against colonists, the Indians 
serving under Philip submitted themselves to the English rather than face 
the torture most commonly associated with Mohawks.,55Jill Lepore 
believes that the assault on Philip during diplomatic relations with the 
Mohawks in 1676 decimated Philip's warriors - an assault from which 
Philip's forces never recovered.156 
All of these theories, however, do not take into account several 
important factors. First, as mentioned earlier in this essay, Philip's forces 
made significant progress in New England from the outset of the war to 
March 1676. Towns and settlements fell more quickly than they were 
repaired, and were abandoned. Garrisons and forts did not prevent 
Philip's forces from maneuvering through the backcountry. Furthermore, 
Nipmuck, Narragansett and Wampanoag forces in the spring of 1676 
were only ten miles from Boston proper.157 If colonists had waited until April 
for Philip's warriors to falter, they would not have survived the summer. 
Furthermore, by calling the initial stages of the war a "setback" for 
the inevitable colonial victory, Leach and Malone ignore the 
contemporary situation in New England. Looking back, one can hardly 
see the "inevitability" of victory during the first half of King Philip's War. Out 
of ninety towns, "52 were attacked...25 pillaged and 17 destroyed."158 
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"Indian attacks produced a wave of refugees who swamped eastern 
towns struggling to sustain the burdens of war."159 As colonists relocated 
closer to Boston, Massachusetts officials passed laws which made it illegal 
to leave settlements for fear that the buffer zone between major port 
cities and Indian forces would be breached.'60 That Massachusetts' 
authorities entertained the idea of building a fortified wall around Boston 
indicates how serious conditions were by 1676]6] 
Secondly, if English technology was superior to their enemies, then 
why did colonists suffer their heaviest losses during the first half of the war? 
In July, when Massachusetts and Plymouth prepared for the war, they 
supplied their soldiers with enough rations for a two-month skirmish.162 This 
means that although colonial authorities believed that their military power 
was superior - they expected to squash Philip in a short time - it was in 
fact vulnerable to Indian skulking. English forces chose to change their 
military tactics because they were, in fact, not effective against the 
Indians. 
Finally, there is no doubt that the Mohawk raid on Philip's forces in 
February 1676 played a significant role in the outcome of the war. 
Mandell argues that the death of many Wampanoag warriors "no doubt 
angered the Nipmuc and Narragansett war leaders," which caused a 
division among leadership.163 The Mohawks decimated Philip's forces. The 
continued success of Mohawk fighters in western New England became a 
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critical turning point in the war as more of Indian warriors surrendered to 
the English to escape Mohawk captivity.164 When Captain Church led his 
company of Indians and English into the backcountry, telling enemy 
combatants 
Come, Come, you look wild and surly, and 
mutter, but that signifies nothing, these my best 
Souldiers were a little while a go as w/7d and surly 
as you are now; by that time you have been but 
one day along with me, you'I love me too, and 
be as brisk as any of them.]65 
Any Indian that submitted directly to Church, and "behave 
themselves...he would do well by them, and they should be his men and 
not Sold out of the Country."*66 Faced with the choice of Mohawk torture 
or submission to colonial forces - especially Church - the Indians chose 
the latter, en masse. 
But the Mohawk raid alone did not stop Philip's forces, nor does this 
theory explain why colonial forces successfully captured hundreds of 
Indians in war. In early March 1676, Massachusetts authorities sent Captain 
William Turner on the first approved skulking mission. Turner marched with 
"a recently released [Indian] captive" and a small company of men -
both Indians and English. When his forces arrived at the native camp of 
Peskeompskut at nightfall, Turner instructed his men to keep quiet and 
wait until sunrise to strike. All night. Turner and his men watched as Indians 
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ate a late-night meal of fish and beef (from cattle killed earlier). Turner's 
company remained so quiet that the Indians at Peskeompskut had no 
idea they were being watched, and Turner noted that they did not bother 
to secure their location with a guard. Finally, upon daybreak, Turner open 
fired on the Indians. Unaware that colonial forces had fallen on them, the 
Indians screamed "Mohawks! Mohawks!"167 This was both the first ambush 
by the colonial forces on Indians, and the first resounding victory of the 
New Year. 
With this, the colonial army took its first military plunge into the 
wilderness and searched for their enemies on their ground. The woods 
were no longer a sanctuary for Philip's forces, thus colonists eliminated the 
unpredictability of Indian attacks. One historian wrote that Turner's attack 
intimidated the Indians and the "tribes became divided and 
demoralized" and soon broke "into small wandering parties."168 Other 
offensive attacks under Major Talcott, Captain Henchman, and Captain 
Mosely pursued enemy forces into the swamps and killed them in great 
numbers, or taking a large amount of captives.169 
Several weeks after Turner's forces ambushed the Peskeompskut 
camp James Avery and George Denison used similar tactics against 
Narragansett forces. Indian scouts and spies alerted Avery and Denison to 
the location of Narragansett forces. The two captains laid an ambush 
similar to the ones Indians laid for colonists during the early stages of the 
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war. When Canonchet, the Narragansett leader pursued the bait, the 
colonial forces outflanked the Narragansetts and open fired.170 According 
to Mandell one of the most "critical turning point[s] was the capture and 
death of the powerful war leader Canonchet."'71 The capture and death 
of Canonchet "was really the death-blow of the war, for he was the real 
leader of all active operations at this time."172 His capture, and the 
surrender of the Narragansett forces days later, effectively eliminated 
Philip's chances to push colonists off his land, and gave the militia the 
much needed morale boost that propelled them into victory. 
Captain Church returned to the war in June 1676 after a four-month 
leave and proved that he was "a person extraordinarily qualified for, and 
adapted to the affairs of war."173 Now that the colony understood the 
effectiveness of skulking in war and approved their soldiers to use it, 
Church quickly employed Indian tactics. In February, when Church 
requested several men to "lye in the Woods as the Enemy did", the 
colonial authorities denied his request. When he returned in June, the 
Governor Josiah Winslow of Plymouth was "particularly glad that 
Providence had brought him there at that juncture" and gave him two 
hundred men, English and Indian, with which to fight Philip. 
In his expeditions he captured the Munponsets without "one 
escaping."174 He captured the forces of Little Eyes by hiding in the forest; 
forced 66 Indians to surrender at the Great Swamp Fight; led the 
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expedition that killed Philip; and his company of Indians and English 
formerly ended the war in the south with the surrender of Anawon.175 For 
his tactical accomplishments, Increase Mather praised him for 
"achievements...so magnanimous and extraordinary, that my reader will 
suspect me to be transcribing the silly old romances, where the knights do 
conquer so many giants."U6 
As for the rest of the army, Reverend John Eliot wrote the following 
to Robert Boyle in October 1677: 
In our first war with the Indians, God pleased to 
shew us the vanity of our military skill, in 
managing our arms, after the European mode. 
Now we are glad to learn the skulking way of 
war.177 
CONCLUSION 
Old World warfare failed in New England where there were no 
battlefield greens or champion fields. Pikes, phalanxes, and swords, which 
were common features of European combat, were useless against 
Indians. The military strategies and brilliant displays, such as pitched 
warfare and the use of drums to signify the arrival of troops, became more 
of a burden in the backcountry. Pike-men were too slow for military 
expeditions in America. Furthermore, formation lines brought colonial 
forces many unnecessary losses. 
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During the first eight months of the war, colonists were not able to 
keep up with Philip's forces and suffered greatly for it. Ambush after 
ambush, colonial forces doubted whether their divine right to subdue and 
conquer the wilderness was in God's plan. Between the outbreak of the 
war in June 1675 and the death of Philip in August 1676, towns and 
colonies called nineteen separate Thanksgivings and Fasts to beg for 
God's forgiveness. At no other time in New England were so many 
Thanksgivings and Fasts called within a one-year period.178 As soldiers' 
morale dropped, so did their confidence that colonial forces would win 
the war. 
When colonists adopted Indian skulking tactics, replaced pike-men 
with foot soldiers, and replaced their rapiers with tomahawks, the tide 
changed.179 Colonial forces responded more quickly to Philip's attacks 
and drove Indians away from vulnerable settlements. Hostile Indians could 
no longer hide in the swamps, or seek protection in the woods because 
colonists were now willing to follow them into those areas. Slowly, soldiers 
became quieter and faster until their tactics were just as unpredictable as 
Philip's. The raid at Peskeompskut by Captain William Turner and his 
company symbolized how effective the English were with Indian skulking 
tactics. Because they were no longer afraid of the swamps, Avery and 
Denison's company captured Canonchet. These events were impossible 
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for the early militia that relied on drums, pikes, flags, and heavy 
equipment. 
The colonists did not win the war alone, however- Indians, who had 
remained loyal to the colony, taught the colonists how to skulk in war. With 
each attack, colonial companies brought with them several Indians who, 
during combat, kept soldiers quiet and hidden. The use of these Indians by 
the colonial forces was another reason the New England colonies were 
victorious in August 1676. 
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CONCLUSION 
On 21 February 1675/6 the colonies realized that their attempts to 
defeat Philip and his allies had failed. Since the beginning of the war, 
Philip's strength had increased, his allies grew, and his goals neared. 
Colonists, on the other hand, were out of money, faced military 
conscription issues and were days away from defeat. Only when the 
colonies grasped the severity of this situation did they realize that their 
military identity needed to change. One week after the coffers were 
announced empty in the February Declaration, the Council of War 
ordered Captain Peirse to use friendly Indians in his next expedition. This 
decision, symbolized the turning point in the war. The adoption of Indians 
and Indian skulking tactics into the colonial militias led colonies to victory. 
Philip's forces and their allies won the majority of battles during the 
early stages of the war because the colonies were not prepared for 
skulking warfare. His victories in critical locations, challenged Old World 
combat methods. In the Old World there were no battlefield greens. Pikes, 
phalanxes, and swords, which were common weapons of the Old World, 
were useless against their new enemies. Heavy armor and loud noises 
intimidated Europeans, but hostile Indians saw slow and noisy soldiers as 
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easy targets. During the first half of the war, Philip appeared to be winning 
the war. 
The February Declaration marked the moment when colonists 
realized that they could no longer carry out the war without help. By 
sending friendly Indians to internment camps, the colonial authorities 
believed they were protecting both the Indians and the English from each 
other. They were protecting both peoples physically and symbolically. The 
English believed that Indians had nothing to contribute to a superior civil 
and military system. When this system collapsed in February, the colonists 
realized that to save their lives they needed help from friendly Indians. 
After February, Indians proved to be vital allies in King Philip's War. 
The military tactics that the Indians taught the colonists during the second 
half of the war saved the colonies from destruction. Additionally, Indians 
provided extra military support at a time when many colonists refused 
duty. These Indians provided a fortification against Wampanoag, 
Narragansett, Nipmuck, and Agawam advances. Finally, successful 
expeditions resulted from the adoption of Indians and Indian tactics, 
which was a more efficient military strategy. 
Indians also supplied colonists with detailed information and 
intelligence on enemy forces. When heeded, this information helped the 
colonies avert disaster. As this thesis illustrates, when colonial authorities 
did not use spies and informants the result was disastrous for the colonies. 
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The February Declaration changed the way that the colonists 
fought King Philip's War. They realized that they could no longer support 
the war alone. Friendly Indians, adopted into the colonial militias, taught 
the colonists the best way to stop Philip's forces. These Indians swelled the 
colonial militias at a time when soldier moral was low. Finally, they 
provided the colonial authorities with information that, when acted upon, 
saved hundreds of lives. There is a clear distinction between the first eight 
months and the latter six months of King Philip's War. From March to 
August 1676, the colonies saw great successes in their military expeditions. 
These successes were due to the friendly Indians who fought for survival 
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